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Abstract
The DoD has recognized the need for persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) over the last two decades. Recent developments with commercial drones
have changed the market structure; there is now a thriving and extensive market base for drone
based remote sensing. This research provides system engineering methods to support the DoD
use of this burgeoning market to meet operational ISR needs. The three contributions of this
research are: a process to support Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) design, tools to
support the design process, and tools to support risk assessment and reduction for both design
and operations. The process and tools are presented via an exemplar design for an ISR SUAS
mission. The exemplar design flows from user needs through to an allocated baseline with an
assessment of system reliability based on a compilation of commercial component reliability and
failure modes.

IV

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank all our special forces personnel who work
relentlessly everyday defending our freedom and performing heroic missions that none of us will
ever hear about. The thesis is aimed towards providing you better tools and equipment to
perform you mission smarter, better, quicker, and more reliably. Next, I would like to think my
advisor, Lt Col Amy Cox, for guiding me through the winding road of technical writing. Thank
you for your candor, inspiration, and most importantly your time. Finally, to my wife, thank you
for your support, understanding, and motivation. I love you more each day and I cannot imagine
where I would be without you in my life, you are truly my better half.

v

Table of Contents
Page
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xv
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Cost is a Mitigated Factor for Military SUAS ............................................................................ 2
Problem Statement ...................................................................................................................... 5
Scope and Assumptions .............................................................................................................. 5
Investigative Questions ............................................................................................................... 6
Materials and Equipment ............................................................................................................ 6
Other Support .............................................................................................................................. 7
Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 7
II. Literature Review ....................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................................................... 9
SUAS Technology Overview ..................................................................................................... 9
Mission Need ............................................................................................................................ 12
Scope ......................................................................................................................................... 13

vi

SUAS Military Applications ..................................................................................................... 13
Previous Systems Engineering Studies Applied to SUAS ........................................................ 16
UAS Reliability ......................................................................................................................... 19
Component Variation SUAS-Trades ........................................................................................ 25
Design for Multiple Functions .................................................................................................. 26
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 30
III. Methods................................................................................................................................... 32
Chapter Overview ..................................................................................................................... 32
Theory ....................................................................................................................................... 32
Material and Equipment ............................................................................................................ 34
Procedures and Process ............................................................................................................. 34
Identify the Stakeholders ...................................................................................................... 37
Define Design Reference Missions ....................................................................................... 37
Critical Functions of the SUAS ............................................................................................ 38
Failure Modes ....................................................................................................................... 38
Generate Checklists .............................................................................................................. 39
Physical Architecture ............................................................................................................ 40
Component Selection ............................................................................................................ 41
Develop Budgets ................................................................................................................... 42
System Reliability ................................................................................................................. 42
vii

Requirements Analysis ......................................................................................................... 43
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 43
IV. Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 45
Chapter Overview ..................................................................................................................... 45
Mission/System Alignment ....................................................................................................... 46
Identify the Stakeholders ...................................................................................................... 46
Define Design Reference Missions ....................................................................................... 49
Critical Functions of the SUAS ............................................................................................ 54
Fault Tree Analysis ............................................................................................................... 58
Reliability Analysis............................................................................................................... 74
Generate Checklists .............................................................................................................. 79
System Design .......................................................................................................................... 87
Define Physical Architecture ................................................................................................ 87
Frame Selection .................................................................................................................... 96
Motor Selection................................................................................................................... 102
ESC Selection ..................................................................................................................... 104
Propeller Selection .............................................................................................................. 106
Flight Computer Selection .................................................................................................. 107
Select Video Transmission System..................................................................................... 109
Camera System Selection ................................................................................................... 112
viii

Power System Selection...................................................................................................... 115
Flight Remote Controller Selection .................................................................................... 117
GCS Selection ..................................................................................................................... 119
Budget Allocation ............................................................................................................... 121
Hover Endurance Calculation ............................................................................................. 125
System Reliability ............................................................................................................... 127
Requirements Analysis ....................................................................................................... 129
V. Results and Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 134
First Investigative Question .................................................................................................... 134
Second Investigative Question................................................................................................ 137
Third Investigative Question................................................................................................... 139
Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 141
Further Research ..................................................................................................................... 142
Implement SUAS product development process for all mission sets. ................................ 142
In depth reliability analysis of critical components. ........................................................... 143
Failure mode testing for commercially fabricated drones. ................................................. 143
Lifecycle modeling for mission specific SUAS.................................................................. 144
Appendix A. SUAS Fault Tree Diagrams................................................................................... 145
Flight Function Fault Tree Diagrams ...................................................................................... 145
Transport Function Fault Tree Diagram ................................................................................. 151
ix

Power Function Fault Tree Diagrams ..................................................................................... 152
Surveillance Function Fault Tree Diagrams ........................................................................... 156
Control Function Fault Tree Diagrams ................................................................................... 161
Appendix B. SUAS Design Online Sources ............................................................................... 170
Appendix C. SUAS Reference CONOPS SENG Design Sequence ........................................... 171
References ................................................................................................................................... 176
Vita.............................................................................................................................................. 182

x

List of Figures
Page
Figure 1. Future Years Defense Program for Department of Defense UAS (Morris, 2018). ......... 2
Figure 2. UAV Cost and Payload Capacity Ranges for DoD UAV Groups (Fladeland,
Schoenung, & Lord, 2017).............................................................................................................. 4
Figure 3. Flight Control Modes .................................................................................................... 10
Figure 4. Electrical and Component Layout of a Typical Drone(“Pixhawk Autopilot,” 2015) ... 11
Figure 5. Possible Airborne Layered Network Configuration (U.S. Air Force, 2016)................. 16
Figure 6. Semi- Autonomous Use Case Diagram (Flenar, 2018) ................................................. 21
Figure 7. Serial System Reliability as a Function of Component Reliability (Ebeling, 2005) ..... 22
Figure 8. NIST Test Methodology for SUAS (Jacof, 2017) ......................................................... 24
Figure 9. The Four Aspects of Changeability (Fricke & Schulz, 2005) ....................................... 28
Figure 10. Initial DoD System Engineering Process Model (DAU, 2017) .................................. 33
Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process.......................................................................... 36
Figure 12. Initial Design Criteria section of Mission/System Alignment .................................... 46
Figure 13. Design Document Process ........................................................................................... 49
Figure 14. ISR Use Case Diagram ................................................................................................ 51
Figure 15. Critical Function Process............................................................................................. 54
Figure 16. Functional Allocation of ISR SUAS System............................................................... 56
Figure 17. Failure Mode Analysis ................................................................................................ 58
Figure 18. Critical Components and Reliability Analysis Process ............................................... 74
Figure 19. Bathtub Failure Rates for Electronics (Wilkins, 2002) ............................................... 77
Figure 20. Hazard/Reliability Matrix............................................................................................ 78

xi

Figure 21. Hazard/Reliability Matrix with Critical Parts.............................................................. 78
Figure 22. Generate Operator Checklist Process .......................................................................... 79
Figure 23. Physical Architecture Process ..................................................................................... 87
Figure 24. SUAS Physical Architecture ....................................................................................... 92
Figure 25. SUAS Internal Block Diagram .................................................................................... 92
Figure 26. Component Selection Process ..................................................................................... 96
Figure 27. Foxtech Hover 1 Folded Dimensions (Foxtech, 2018) ............................................. 100
Figure 28. Foxtech Hover 1 Unfolded Dimensions (Foxtech, 2018) ......................................... 101
Figure 29. T-Motor MN3508 380 KV (T-Motor, 2018b) ........................................................... 103
Figure 30. T-Motor Antigravity 4006 KV380 (T-Motor, 2018a) ............................................... 103
Figure 31. Castle Creations Talon 25 AMP ESC, 6S/25V with 8 AMP BEC (Castle Creations,
2018) ........................................................................................................................................... 105
Figure 32. KDE-CF155-DP 15.5” x 5.3 Propeller (KDE Direct, 2018) ..................................... 107
Figure 33. Wiring Diagram Pixhawk 2 Cube (Hex, 2018) ......................................................... 109
Figure 34. Amimon Connex LR Receiver and Connex Mini Transmitter (getfpv.com, 2018a,
2018b) ......................................................................................................................................... 112
Figure 35. Concept of Operations Connex LR Video Receiver (Amimon, 2018) ..................... 112
Figure 36. FH310Z Camera with Gimbal System (Foxtech, 2017) ............................................ 114
Figure 37. FH310Z Camera with Gimbal System Mounted on Foxtech Hover 1 Platform
(Foxtech, 2017) ........................................................................................................................... 114
Figure 38. 10000mAh 6S 10C Multi-Rotor Lipo Pack XT90 (Amazon, 2018) ......................... 117
Figure 39. Futaba T14SG transmitter (Futaba, 2018) ................................................................. 118
Figure 40. QGroundControl User Interface (“QGroundControl User Guide,” 2018) ................ 120

xii

Figure 41. Budget Allocation Process ........................................................................................ 121
Figure 42. System Reliability and Requirement Analysis .......................................................... 125
Figure 43. Reliability Block Diagram, Flight System ................................................................ 129
Figure 44. Reliability Block Diagram, Surveillance System ...................................................... 129
Figure 45. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Full View ........................................................... 145
Figure 46. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Motor Failure ..................................................... 146
Figure 47. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Propeller and Flight Computer Failure .............. 147
Figure 48. Provide Stability Fault Tree Diagram........................................................................ 148
Figure 49. Launch Fault Tree Diagram....................................................................................... 149
Figure 50. Recover and Reuse Fault Tree Diagram .................................................................... 150
Figure 51. Pack and Store Fault Tree Diagram........................................................................... 151
Figure 52. Monitor Fault Tree Diagram ..................................................................................... 152
Figure 53. Distribute Fault Tree Diagram................................................................................... 153
Figure 54. Regulate Fault Tree Diagram .................................................................................... 154
Figure 55. Store Fault Tree Diagram .......................................................................................... 155
Figure 56. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Full View ............................................. 156
Figure 57. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Sensor Defect and Environment Failures
..................................................................................................................................................... 157
Figure 58. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Sensor Configuration and Gimbal Failures
..................................................................................................................................................... 158
Figure 59. Transmit and Receive Fault Tree Diagram ............................................................... 159
Figure 60. Human Interface Fault Tree Diagram........................................................................ 160
Figure 61. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Full View ...................................................... 161

xiii

Figure 62. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Gimbal and Mode Failures ........................... 162
Figure 63. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Zoom, Power, and Sensor Failures ............... 163
Figure 64. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: Full View.......................................................... 164
Figure 65. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: RC Failure ........................................................ 165
Figure 66. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: Autopilot and Flight Computer Failure ............ 166
Figure 67. Failsafe Fault Tree Diagram ...................................................................................... 167
Figure 68. Guidance Fault Tree Diagram ................................................................................... 168
Figure 69. Provide Status Fault Tree Diagram ........................................................................... 169

xiv

List of Tables
Page
Table 1. SUAS Military Future Military Applications ................................................................. 15
Table 2. ISR Design Requirements ............................................................................................... 53
Table 3. Functional Description of ISR SUAS System ................................................................ 57
Table 4. Flight: Generate Lift Fault Tree Table ............................................................................ 61
Table 5. Flight: Provide Stability Fault Tree Table ...................................................................... 62
Table 6. Flight: Launch Fault Tree Table ..................................................................................... 63
Table 7. Flight: Recover and Reuse Fault Tree Table .................................................................. 63
Table 8. Transport: Pack and Store Fault Tree Table ................................................................... 64
Table 9. Power: Monitor Fault Tree Table ................................................................................... 65
Table 10. Power: Distribute Fault Tree Table .............................................................................. 65
Table 11. Power: Regulate Fault Tree Table ................................................................................ 66
Table 12. Power: Store Fault Tree Table ...................................................................................... 67
Table 13. Surveillance: Observe Environment Fault Tree Table ................................................. 67
Table 14. Surveillance: Transmit and Receive Fault Tree Table.................................................. 68
Table 15. Surveillance: Human Interface Fault Tree Table .......................................................... 69
Table 16. Control: Sensor Control Fault Tree Table .................................................................... 70
Table 17. Control: Flight Control Fault Tree Table ...................................................................... 71
Table 18. Control: Failsafe Fault Tree Table ................................................................................ 72
Table 19. Control: Guidance Fault Tree Table ............................................................................. 73
Table 20. Control: Provide Status Fault Tree Table ..................................................................... 73
Table 21. Failure Rates for Category I Components .................................................................... 76

xv

Table 22. Pre-Flight Checklist ...................................................................................................... 80
Table 23. Pre-Deployment Checklists .......................................................................................... 82
Table 24. Initial Flight Checklists ................................................................................................. 84
Table 25. Spares Checklist ............................................................................................................ 86
Table 26. Multirotor Design Checklist ......................................................................................... 88
Table 27. SUAS Design Trade Space ........................................................................................... 94
Table 28. Quadrotor Frame Options ............................................................................................. 98
Table 29. Quadrotor Frame Options (Foxtech, 2018; glassfox, 2017) ......................................... 99
Table 30. Frequency Budget ....................................................................................................... 122
Table 31. Weight Budget with Cost ............................................................................................ 123
Table 32. Power Budget .............................................................................................................. 124
Table 33. Endurance Calculations .............................................................................................. 127
Table 34. Requirement Analysis for ISR Mission ...................................................................... 131
Table 35. SUAS Design Online Sources .................................................................................... 170

xvi

PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
I. Introduction
Demand is increasing for operational and tactical information superiority in the deployed
environment. Due to the diversity of enemy tactics, varying terrain, and users, each mission type
may require specific system requirements to meet performance objectives. Small Unmanned
Aerial Systems (SUAS) are excellent tools to provide deployed operators increased situational
awareness on the battlefield. Tactical deployed operators desire low transport size and weight,
rapid customization, and low system complexity, SUASs meet this need.
An opportunity exists within the commercial drone industry due to rapid technical
advancement from increased competition and lower technical entry barriers. This market can be
leveraged to design simple SUASs that meet mission requirements with low development time
and financial commitment. The following thesis will use current system engineering tools and
methods to establish a SUAS product design process that meets mission requirements and
mitigates system risks.
DoD program offices currently contract out design and platform support for SUAS. This
current structure limits the programs office’s ability to own the technical baseline. Where the
owning this baseline involves understanding how the SUAS performs and is operated;
facilitating shifts in the design to new or emergent mission sets. With ownership, the program
office can respond in a timely manner to operator needs, reducing product time to the field. A
detailed knowledge of the system also enables the program office to understand technology
trends to map to future capability gaps of the warfighter. This research presents a process to
enable DoD program offices to align tactical and operational customers’ demands with a reliable
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SUASs. We assess that this process will have multiple benefits, alleviating UAS budgetary
pressure and contractor limitation of the SUAS design model.
Cost is a Mitigated Factor for Military SUAS
Within a military context, funds are projected through a five-year view titled the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP). Figure 1 projects the approximate spending through the FYDP
for group four and five drones, the data indicates an in increase procurement and operation and
maintenance cost over that time (Morris, 2018). Group four and five drones weigh greater than
1320 lbs and are predominately made up of the Air Force’s RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper,
MQ-1 Predator, the Army’s MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-5 Hunter (Dempsey, 2010).
Global Hawks cost $140 to $211 million per system and the other systems are in the $530 million range. Beyond unit cost, one can see in Figure 1 that maintenance costs are projected
to grow through 2021 due to the increasing number of deployed drones and increased
capabilities. To underline the growth in cost and capability, a new Reaper squadron costs $160
million annually, in contrast to $70 million for a legacy Predator squadron.

Figure 1. Future Years Defense Program for Department of Defense UAS (Morris, 2018).
2

The growth in cost, both procurement and maintenance are constrained by available
budget. How does the DoD fulfill its need for persistent ISR within fiscal constraints? One path
to reduce UAS costs is to field more capable large group UAS, while decreasing overall
inventory and maintenance cost. Another path is fielding smaller, mission specific UAS
controlled by soldiers on the ground (Morris, 2018). Implementation of smaller UAS would
include mass customized systems with short life spans, focusing on reducing maintenance cost in
favor of platform flexibility to new or evolving mission sets.
Separate from the growing demand for persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) in the DoD, other technological advances have spurned a rapidly
expanding and active commercial market. The Commercial drone sector supports aerial
photography, shipping, disaster management, search and rescue, geological mapping, building
safety, crop monitoring, unmanned cargo transport, law enforcement and border control, and
storm tracking. “Projections to 2025 show commercial drones could be an $82 billion industry
with a 100,000 job boost to the U.S. economy” (Jenkins and Vasigh, 2013). As demand increases
for drone functionality and technology, investments will increase from industrial conglomerates,
electronic parts companies, and information technology firms, this increased activity in turn
lowers prices and increases available functionality (D. Joshi, 2017). There are overlaps between
DoD and commercial needs. This overlap poses an opportunity whereby the DoD can benefit
from the commercial sectors investments. The DoD can exploit the diverse functionality
provided by the market to meet its needs at a lower cost.
Figure 2 displays the cost in millions of dollars in comparison to the payload weight in
pounds for the five DoD defined UAS groups. Group one, Mini UAS, is 3 orders of magnitude of
cost smaller than a group five, High Altitude Long Endurance UAS, or 2.5 orders of magnitude
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smaller than a group four, Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAS. For every group five UAS,
1,250 group one UAS can be bought or 163 for every group four UAS. While individually less
capabile, the individual cost, risks, and barriers of smaller UAS pose an opportunity. SUAS
provide disaggregated risk (lose of one SUAS versus one HALE), lower cost and possibility of
mass customoziation for user need (Joseph Pine, 1992).

Figure 2. UAV Cost and Payload Capacity Ranges for DoD UAV Groups (Fladeland,
Schoenung, & Lord, 2017)

Commercial drones are a further price point reduction from contracted military drones.
“Purchase prices for small drones are currently on the order of, for hobbyist devices, $100 to
$1,000, and for low-end professional use $5,000 to $10,000. For some applications, the
indicative costs per hour of flight are currently on the order of $25 for small drones compared
with $750 for manned fixed-wing aircraft and $1,350 for manned rotorcraft. For applications for
which the limitations are acceptable, such as the gathering of moderate-quality image and video,
small drones are now vastly more economic than aircraft, and much more economic than large
drones. This is naturally giving rise to both substitution effects and new customers.” (Clarke,
4

2014) For comparison a military group 1 UAS, RQ-11B Raven, costs $250,000 for the complete
system including the air vehicle, ground station, and support equipment (Army Technology,
2018).
Problem Statement
Currently the design of SUAS systems is left to functional experts or DoD contractors
due to perceived system complexity. This research asserts that the ease and maturity of the
commercial drone market has reduced entry barriers allowing for a broader base of system
designer. The DoD can leverage these newly available technologies to design SUASs for military
utility. A specific methodology does not exist for engineers or program managers with technical
backgrounds to design a SUAS, using commercial parts, for a given reference mission.
Scope and Assumptions
The analysis has been restricted to Group 1 UAS. All vehicle weights must be under 20
lbs (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). Group 1 UAS size fits within the parameters of
commercially available components for drones, which is the focus of this research. Group 1 UAS
size also fits the transportation requirements of the selected Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) exemplar of this research.
Time constraints only permitted one reference system to be demonstrated. The reference
system aligns with current capabilities of SUAS and are focused at a duration between 30-60
minutes for an ISR payload capability. Requirements from this mission set have been established
and will be the basis for the component and system performance criteria within the research.
Commercial components that are available to the public are the focus of the analysis,
since the commercial drone market has matured to a point in which the DoD can leverage it for
military utility. Commercial components were required to be available and accessible from
5

online drone manufactures or hobbyist sites in order to be analyzed in this thesis. DoD
Contractors such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman and their SUAS
components were outside the scope of this research. The performance for these components has
been previously documented and demonstrated via DoD programs of record.
The reference SUAS is an initial concept only and does not consider ruggedizing,
weatherproofing, or cyber security integration. The research is focused on developing a concept
development process for SUASs and is not focused on production level system maturity. Followon research is required to develop and validate testable measures for the reference SUAS
performance for defined operational conditions.
The reference SUAS design space considers only multirotor platforms using a battery
power system. This limitation enables the design space for the reference SUAS to be
manageable, yet thorough, and within the constraints of thesis research. A multirotor platform
was chosen due to the authors experience and familiarity with such platforms through the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) SUAS design sequence. Battery power sources were only
considered due to the popularity within the commercial drone market.
Investigative Questions
1. What systems engineering methods are appropriate for a tailored rapid SUAS design
process?
2. What baseline design tools and heuristics are required to support decisions for vehicle
performance, trades, reliability, assessment and follow-on designs?
3. What SUAS components are critical to mission success and can reliability rates be found,
documented, and analyzed for these components?
Materials and Equipment




Cameo Systems Modeler SysML modeling tool by No Magic
o Use Case Diagrams
o Functional Architecture
o Physical Architecture
Free Fault Tree Analysis Software, Fault Tree Analyser (ALD, 2018)
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Microsoft Excel documenting
o Fault Tree Tables
o Requirements
o Operator Checklists
o Design Trade Space/Checklist
o Reliability Analysis

Other Support
UAS manufacturers of critical parts often have reputation among hobbyists and
enthusiasts. These individuals possess a level of knowledge on the operational performance of
critical components that must be captured in order to completely assess the reliability. The Air
Force Institute of Technology possesses the Autonomy, Navigation, and Timing (ANT) lab
which tests SUAS in various configuration. Interviews will be conducted with ANT lab design
experts on critical components to establish which manufactures of parts they prefer (of high
quality and reliability) and which manufactures they do not prefer (of low quality and reliability).
These staff members have decades of experience with remote controlled aircraft as well as the
recent growing SUAS market. Interviews will provide input into the component selection
process for the ISR mission design exemplar.
In addition to interviewing the ANT Lab staff, the greater drone and hobbyist community
provides a wealth of knowledge on drone designs, reliable components, and measured
performance. Various hobby websites are used to gather these inputs and to make informed
engineering decisions. Appendix B provides a list of online drone sources used throughout
section IV, including the focus of the website.
Overview
Chapter II focuses on pertinent literature supporting system design for a small UAS. The
review includes an investigation into previous system designs for SUAS and any documented
7

methodologies. In Chapter III, the general System Engineering Process is defined and applied to
a specific SUAS Product Development Process. This process is then used in Chapter IV for an
Information Superiority SUAS mission set, and outputs a reference SUAS. Finally, Chapter V
documents the benefits of the SUAS Product Development Process and key products produced
for the program office.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The goal of this chapter is to investigate literature on system engineering techniques, and
trades in order to inform the creation of a tailored product development process for Small
Unmanned Aerial System (SUAS). This review also provides a background on SUAS and the
associated military applications. This background informs our tailored systems engineering
process, which will be outlined in Chapter III and demonstrated in Chapter IV. This thesis
provides a system design methodology for SUAS based on established military operational
reference missions. Trades will be performed on air vehicle designs, critical component types,
materials, integration, and redundancy in order to determine the highest system reliability that
still meets the operational reference mission requirements.
SUAS Technology Overview
A SUAS is defined as a controllable air vehicle providing increased functionality to the
operator on the ground. Domestically, civil use of SUAS is limited to aircraft weighing less than
55 lbs in, operating below 400 ft above ground level at speeds below 100 mph (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2016). Control of the air vehicle is established through a ground control station
(GCS), which receives flight inputs from the operator and sends instructions via radio transmitter
to the onboard flight computer. Control can be passed in two modes. The first is through a GCS
software module enabling input for Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates and flight
paths. The software can be run on a laptop, tablet, or phone. This control mode can be performed
semi-autonomous where the user is actively sending command to the air vehicle through the
GCS, or autonomous where the flight program is loaded on the ground and the air vehicle
performs the mission without airborne commands from the GCS. The second mode is through a
9

Radio Controller enabling the operator to control the vehicle directly. In this mode the operator
usually has a form of visual feedback for their control inputs, the most common type is first
person point of view goggles (FPV). The flight computer or autopilot sends commands signals to
the air vehicle’s motors, servos, and sensors. Furthermore, the computer keeps track of telemetry
data including altitude, air speed, direction, battery voltage, and GPS coordinates; this
information is routed back to the GCS software providing situational awareness for the operator.
The different control modes can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Flight Control Modes

Batteries are the common fuel choice for SUASs, enabling powered flight and sensor
functionality. Power is routed to the flight computer and motors. Electronic speed controllers
(ESCs) regulate the power output and control signals from the flight computer to the motors.
The number of motors is dependent on the architecture of the air vehicle. For example,
quadrotors have four motors, hexrotors have six, and octorotors eight. Motors are rated in KVs
10

defined as revolutions per minute per volt applied or RPM/Volt. Higher KV motors spin faster
and pair with smaller propellers, while lower KV motors spin slower and pair with larger
propellers (“How to Build a Drone - A Definitive Guide For Newbies,” 2018). Power available is
ultimately a function of the number of propellers and motors, their RPM, and torque. Propellers
on SUAS spin in opposite directions to their neighbors in order to balance torque effects in air.
Simpler SUAS design usually have an even set of motors to attain this balance. Further changes
in balance are leveraged to attain yaw, pitch, and roll or general aerial control.
Battery elimination circuits (BECs) are similar to ESCs, but regulate voltage from the
battery and enable a step down of 5V or 12V for critical electronics (Alex, 2015). Sensors enable
increased situational awareness, which is the main functionality of the drone. Sensors are
mounted on the SUAS’s frame or on a gimbal. A gimbal allows movement for the sensor in one
or multiple axes with operator input through the GCS. Figure 4 provides a visual description of
the SUAS system.

Figure 4. Electrical and Component Layout of a Typical Drone(“Pixhawk Autopilot,” 2015)
11

Mission Need
Demand for information superiority is constantly on the rise in the deployed
environment. Increasing budget pressure due to the 2011 Budget Control Act and reliance on
unmanned technology and capabilities have forced the Department of Defense (DoD) into one of
two paths to cut costs. The first path involves reducing the number of large Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS), while focusing on increased functionality of the individual systems. The second
path is fielding smaller, less capable UAS controlled by soldiers on the ground (Morris, 2018).
SUAS components have decreased in cost due to reduced FAA drone restrictions. By
reducing restrictions, the drone industry is more accessible to the public and industry, promoting
a rise in functionality and application of drones in the civil sector. Higher demand has resulted in
increased supply of drones and their components, which has led to reduced cost. The rise of the
hobbyist industry has diffused information of drones, components, building, and configuration to
the public through online blogs and forums. This diffusion has reduced complexity and entry
barriers to the drone community. The DoD can leverage this industrial movement to procure,
build, test, and push the functional boundaries of SUAS, while mitigating cost, airworthiness
risks, and reliability risks.
Currently, a system design methodology is lacking for the military in building and
mapping SUASs to a given operational or design reference mission with quantitative
requirements. This thesis will focus on establishing a reference missions within the scope of
current SUAS capabilities, then utilizing model-based systems engineering processes to build a
representative system. The objective of the design process is to build the a reliable SUAS system
through systems and component level trades while meeting the reference mission requirements.
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The goal of the thesis is to provide a simplified process allowing the DoD to own the technical
baseline of the SUASs.
Scope
This work is bounded by the following constraints. They have been chosen to allow for a
less ill-structured problem; a space amenable to a defined design process. The process is
demonstrated and validated with a specific design reference mission.






Total air vehicle weight is below 20 lbs
Only electrical power systems will be analyzed with a focus on current accepted and
proven battery composition of lithium polymer batteries
Air vehicle frame types will include multirotor types only
Commercially and widely available components, frames, and materials will be evaluated
System modeling will focus on the concept development phase of systems engineering

SUAS Military Applications
A 2007 study performed by Office of the Secretary of Defense showed unmanned
systems are better suited for mission which are either dull, dirty, and/or dangerous, opposed to
manned systems. Dull missions involve long hours of low stimulus to the operator or warfighter.
Examples include surveillance missions or regional coverage mission. If the UAS handles the
information collection and detection for these missions, it is superior to manned systems where
fatigue can set in creating mistakes. Dirty missions include conditions which pose longer term
risks to manned air crews such as radiation or chemical measurements. UASs excel in this
mission set with specific sensors which keep the operators out of harm’s way. Dangerous
mission sets include conditions which pose an immediate risk to human operator; an example
include neutralization of improvised explosive devices. Unmanned systems lower human cost if
the mission is unsuccessful (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007).
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The United States Air Force SUAS Flight Plan: 2016-2036, outlines that SUAS
technology and operational evolution should aim at bridging the gap between tactical and
strategic mission sets. The document argues “historically tactical SUASs are now mature enough
to augment or assume Air Force requirements with operational and strategic impact.” (U.S. Air
Force, 2016) This evolution of SUASs utility requires correct integration of technology, mission
development, and human-system integration.
Envisioned SUAS applications or vignettes for future operations for the Air Force are:
Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD/DEAD), Strike Coordination and
Reconnaissance (SCAR), Counter-UAS (C-UAS), Beyond-Line-Of-Sight (BLOS), “Perch and
Stare”, Sensor Air Drop, Weather Sensing, Airborne Layered Network (ALN), Nuclear Weapons
Enterprise Operations Support, and Information Superiority (U.S. Air Force, 2016). The SUAS
applications and their descriptions are outlined in Table 1.
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Table 1. SUAS Military Future Military Applications
Mission

Description

BLOS

Involves sending SUASs from a host vehicle to destroy, jam, or overwhelm
the enemy’s air defense forces. Focus attributes include weapons capability,
high speed, long range, and sensor detect payload.
Provides valuable intelligence back to larger platforms, host or operators.
Intelligence includes detect and attack targets, minimization of collateral
damage, and battle damage assessments. Focus attributes include locating
and verifying target, communication with other assets, passing updates.
Employs SUASs to jam, destroy, or deceive enemy drones which pose a
threat.
Enables SUAS to operate over the horizon with increased range. Technique
envisioned include air vehicle relays on SUASs or other larger vehicles.

"Perch and
Stare"

Focuses on having SUASs in a loiter mode with low power levels to collect,
analyze, communicate, and monitor over long duration mission. Focus areas
are battery technology, solar power, utilization of the enemy’s power grid,
and cyber-surveillance technology.

Sensor Air
Drop

Enables delivery of various sensor types via the air including communication,
seismic, acoustic, magnetic, daylight and infrared imagers. This capability
keeps military members off the front lines and away from potential enemy
risks. An additional use is geolocation information for covert emplacements
and gathering critical intelligence before the emplacements are destroyed or
defeated.

Weather
Sensing

Provides real time weather data on demand for mission planning. Employing
more SUASs improves regional weather reports into the Area of Command
(AOC) weather data base; operators can pull up accurate and timely weather
data for their locations.

SEAD/DEAD

SCAR
C-UAS

Airborne
Layered
Network
Nuclear
Weapons
Enterprise
Support
Information
Superiority

Enables multi-platforms, multi-sensor SUAS networks to support future
concepts including swarming. Position, sensor data, and communication can
be shared across multiple platforms allowing SUAS to focus on specific
functionality within a network, increasing the swarm’s overall capability and
resiliency. See Figure 5 for typical ALN configuration.
Focuses on domestic protection of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
complexes with capabilities of enemy detection, enemy attack, and
information gather for possible intruders.
Critical decisions require rapid decision-making process. SUAS promote
rapidly transmitted photos and video for command decisions on enemies,
troop movement, and situational awareness.
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Figure 5. Possible Airborne Layered Network Configuration (U.S. Air Force, 2016)

Previous Systems Engineering Studies Applied to SUAS
While limited, SUAS research exists for military applications with some system design
case studies available providing information. The first step in the design process is to define
requirements and minimum performance criteria for the system, based on mission scenarios and
profiles. Mission profiles should establish typical and maximum altitudes, cruise and maximum
speed, loiter speed, climb rate, endurance, and operational radius. Common performance
requirements include: reliability, maintainability, availability, mobility, transportability,
deployability, sustainability, environmental and electromagnetic effects, survivability,
vulnerability, safety, interchangeability, and upgradeability (Torun, 2002).
Careful attention should be paid to prioritizing requirements for system level trades. The
design team should investigate representative systems that can meet proposed requirements and
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document strengths and weaknesses (Ozdemir et al., 2014). With the establishment of
representative systems, component trades can be performed based on available technology.
When performing trades there must be discriminators to base trades around.
Discriminators are based around either prioritized requirements or costs. With discriminator
criteria established the air vehicle design process can ensue. This process is done in a bottom up
approach by designing and evaluating subsystems first and then the complete system.
Subsystems include propulsion, controls, structural, and payload.
A specific system engineering method is the systems architecting with ilities (SAI). This
method is appropriate for the concept development phase of the systems engineering process.
This process supports architecture development where “architecting is the process of structuring
the components of a system, their interrelationship, and their evolution over time” (Dagli &
Kilicay-Ergin, 2009). Sturdivant and Chong detail the steps of the SAI method in their 2017
journal article;









Step 1 – Determine Value Proposition and Constraints: this involves identifying and
prioritizing requirements in the context of the overall architecture.
Step 2 – Identify Potential Perturbations: What are the risks or modes which can interfere
with delivery of value from the system?
Step 3 – Identify Initial Desired Ilities: Ilities are the longer term aspects and behavior of
the system, the designer must rank and prioritize ilities including but not limited to
reliability, maintainability, and availability.
Step 4 – Generate Initial Architecture Alternatives: generate alternatives and trades
which promote requirements.
Step 5 – Generate Ility-Driving Options: generate alternatives and trades which promote
desired ilities.
Step 6 – Evaluate Potential Alternatives: model alternatives with desired metrics (cost,
attributes, and ilities). This analysis can occur through modeling and simulation or higher
abstraction levels.
Step 7 – Analyze Architecture Alternatives: perform evaluation of tradeoffs which exists
from step 6 and document impact to overall architecture.
Step 8 – Trade-off and Select “Best” Architecture with Ilities: utilize results from step 7
to determine preferred architecture to move forward into design (Sturdivant & Chong,
2017).
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An additional system engineering method utilized for reliability analysis is Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), which determines what can go wrong in the system with
representative probabilities and consequences. FMEA focuses on the early design phase,
“minimizing the probability of failure or the effect of failure” (Dermentzoudis, 2004). There are
basic questions the designer needs to answer when performing FMEA
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

How can each part of the system possibly fail?
What are mechanisms might produce these modes of failure?
What could the effects be if the failures occur?
Is the failure in the safe or unsafe direction?
How is the failure detected?
What inherent provisions are provided in the design to compensate for the
failures?(Hoyland & Rausand, 1994)

When performing FMEA it is important to know that failures are not weighted equally; some
failures can create an unrecoverable event and others are recoverable. In the case of SUAS, if a
motor fails on a hexacopter it is recoverable, due to motor redundancy, versus a quadrotor where
the vehicle unrecoverable. It is also important to know the customers’ requirements for the
system. For example, if the SUAS is for Special Forces personnel they may emphasize packing
of the system into a backpack, as opposed to Security Forces personnel who may emphasize
packing the system into a Humvee. In both cases, being unable to pack and transport the SUAS
in the required area is deemed a required function. Each function in the system must have a
purpose and objective. By identifying these in the design process, faults can be better
understood. Focus must always be placed on a fault prevention orientation (Stamatis, 1995).
FMEA is an iterative process. The system should be diagramed to show physical
components and functionality so the design team can understand component and subsystem
interactions. Once diagrammed, the design team should evaluate and collect any data on the
components of the system in order to evaluate and brainstorm for potential failure modes.
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When the failure modes are determined they are prioritized based on severity. If then
statements are useful at this phase of the analysis to determine consequences. Some
operationalization of the consequence severity must be established to compare failures against
each other; a 1-10 scale is often used. The probability of a failure for a part can be determined by
using failure data of the part. If data is not available, the failure probability must be estimated;
knowing causes of failure can produce a better estimate. Finally, a risk priority number (RPN) is
assigned to each part or component of the system based on the parts severity of failure multiplied
by the probability of failure. RPN can be summed for a total system RPN. Additionally, the
RPNs can be listed from highest to smallest. In the concept development phase FMEA process
can be performed cyclically to buy down the RPN level and identify critical component trades
(Stamatis, 1995)(Dermentzoudis, 2004).
UAS Reliability
Reliability is defined as “the capacity of a component or a system to perform its required
function under stated operating conditions for a specified period of time.” (Ebeling, 2005) In the
case of SUASs, operating conditions are bounded by the defined requirements and environment
over the mission duration. Reliability is measured and estimated through modeling of parameters
including Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) or Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). MTTF is
used to measure parts which are non-repairable while MTBF is used for reparable parts (Petritoli,
Leccese, & Ciani, 2017). Evaluating reliability is often done by measuring the unreliability of the
system or the likelihood of failure over a set time (Justin & Murtha, 2009).
Determining mission success for a SUAS revolves around the system’s ability to perform
its critical functions and providing use to operator on the ground. Utility, in the case of an
Information Superiority mission, is the ability for the operator to have increased situational
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awareness beyond their current location. There are three critical functions which enable an
increase of situational awareness. The first is flight; this enables the air vehicle to provide
increased perspective to the operator. Then next is control; the operator can provide instructions
to the air vehicle and the air vehicle responds to these commands. For purposes of this thesis,
control is semi-autonomous where the system can perform functions on its own but at some point
requires instructions from the operator to perform actions (Flenar, 2018). The next category is
surveillance; the capability provided is visual, audio, or environmental measurements and must
be obtainable by the operator. The system must also be transported to the deployment location
with a high level of confidence of functionality. Finally, the air vehicle and support equipment
must have power in order to perform all required functions.
If any of these critical functions fail, then the system is not performing the required
functions and is considered a system failure. Flenar presents a semi- autonomous use case
diagram in his thesis shown in Figure 6. Use cases define the modes or phases the system
operates or exists in within the environment. All the use cases can be related to a critical function
or multiple critical functions. Perform Setup enables flight, control and payload activation.
Launch and Ingress, Egress and Recover, and Loiter support flight and control, if designated
navigation points are established. Perform Surveillance, Follow Target, and Deliver Payload
support control and payload operation. Plan Mission supports control. The use cases provide
further allocation of the critical functions, while aligning closer to the operation mission and
requirements.

20

Figure 6. Semi- Autonomous Use Case Diagram (Flenar, 2018)

Components contribute to reliability ratings of critical functions. These effects can be
seen in Figure 7. As more parts are added, N, the overall system reliability decreases
exponentially. This function is true for componentry in serial configuration, meaning if one
component in the architecture fails the entire system fails. For SUAS serial configuration is a fair
assumption since design emphasis is placed on light, low cost systems. When considering design
trades the number of components become as important as the individual reliability of
components (Ebeling, 2005). Component count can also have a large impact the systems
sustainment, changeability, and modularity. If failures are isolated and attributed to easily
replaceable components or modules, then reliability analysis becomes more manageable.
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Figure 7. Serial System Reliability as a Function of Component Reliability (Ebeling,
2005)

Measures of Performance (MOPs) are required to measure system reliability of SUAS.
MOPs are historical in nature, meaning an event must occur to achieve a data point. In order to
capture and record historical data, a database must be available and used to record this
information. At this point in time neither the DoD nor the U.S. Air Force maintains a
consolidated database for SUAS performance.
Dermentzoudis (2004) discusses measures for a system with limited data. He states the
number of flight hours and the number of crashes are usually known for a given deployed air
vehicle. With this information, the only MOPs available for reliability measures are crash rate,
current crash rate, and crash rate “X”. Crash rate is the current number of crashes divided by the
total number of flight hours. Current crash rate is the same measure except for recording from
the last know system modification. This measure is useful as a comparison data point to ensure
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the system modification is increasing reliability. Finally, crash rate “X” is the number of crashes
per a set number of hours enabling a view of trends including: weather impacts, supply chain
disruptions, part burn in, or lifecycle analysis (Dermentzoudis, 2004).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) managed by the U.S.
Department of Commerce established the Standard Test Methods for Responsive Robots. The
test program’s objective is to “measure a baseline of robot/operator capabilities necessary to
perform operation tasks defined by the user” (Jacof et al., 2013). The tests are designed to project
whether the robot can perform operationally through testing.
The NIST testing strategy encompasses SUAS below 2 kg, 30 knot speed, and frangible
composition. Specific SUAS test include station keeping in both horizontal and vertical
positions, endurance and power test for a set path, and safety tests of impact and lost
communication behavior. In addition to SUAS tests, NIST test sensor performance including
latency, range, audio, color accuracy, and mapping. The overall system test “measures robot,
maneuvering, mobility, manipulation, sensing, endurance, radio communication, durability,
reliability, logistics, and safety”(Jacof et al., 2013), with a goal of providing quantitative data for
different platforms to support operator training, purchase decisions, and operational
performance. Individual test trials are run to achieve 80 % reliability with 80% confidence. Tests
are run in 30 repetitions and only 3 failures of meeting test objectives are allowed for statistical
significance (Jacof et al., 2013).
A fault condition is defined as “A failure of the robotic system preventing completion of
10 or more continuous repetitions. This could include a stuck or disabled vehicle requiring
maintenance, or software issues at the remote operator control unit. All such failures are
catalogued during testing to help identify recurring issues.” (Jacof, 2017). Figure 8 details the
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NIST methodology for SUAS testing. The first testing mode is elemental, focusing on individual
capabilities for the system and repeatable outcomes. The system then graduates to combination
testing of capabilities to determine system tradeoffs and performance. Finally, the system is
tested in operational scenarios where variables are uncontrolled aiding in predicting performance
for a representative environment (Jacof, 2017).

Figure 8. NIST Test Methodology for SUAS (Jacof, 2017)
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Component Variation SUAS-Trades
This section will evaluate the design and component variation with SUASs. The focus is
on the multirotor platform family powered by lithium polymer batteries. This focus aligns with
the analysis section and keeps the scope focused.
Frame design variations predominately revolve around the number of motors used.
Bicopter includes two rotors, tricopeter include three rotors, quadcopter includes four rotors, and
so on up to octocopter. The higher the number of motors the more lift the platform can generate,
equating to larger payload capability.
More motors also equate to redundancy and increase system robustness. For example, a
hexacopter (six rotors) can theoretically have three motors go out and still be recovered, if the
non-functioning motors are opposite of each other. Downsides to increasing the number of rotors
are larger platform size and weight, decreased power efficiency, larger costs, reduced
transportability, and additional parts/maintenance (Liang, 2016). The most popular
configurations for multirotors are even number builds: quad, hexa, and octo. Even build
multirotors alternate the spin direction to cancel out torque forces to stay balanced in flight
(Liang, 2016). Quadcopters benefit from being light and small but will fail in flight immediately
if a single motor fails. Hexacopters and octocopters benefit from motor redundancy and
increased lift.
Multirotor drones can fly at high speeds, perform vertical take-offs and landings, and
excel at surveillance (Hassanalian & Abdelkefi, 2017). Loiter or hover positions are not ideal for
endurance due to the high-power consumption for stabilized flight. With the multiplicity of
motors, the operators has a high level of control of movements which enables the platform to be
extremely agile and responsive (Hassanalian & Abdelkefi, 2017). Focus must be paid to pairing
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motors and propellers in alignment with the air vehicles size and weight to gain optimal
efficiency of the rotors. Multirotors also benefit from simplified control systems promoting
lower complexity and higher reliability (Hassanalian & Abdelkefi, 2017).
Future trends project that SUASs will continue to reduce in size and weight. Most of the
improvements will come from the hobby industry due to market demand and supply. Higher
energy density in fuel choices, including batteries, will increase endurance and range (Herrera,
Dechant, Green, & Klein, 2017) . Herrera also details that capabilities will continue to increase
due to advancement in other industries and suppliers including robotics, communication, power,
sensors, and networking. Projections are that SUASs will eventually be able to carry more
payload than the air vehicle weight (Herrera et al., 2017). Additionally, Herrera states, vehicles
will continue to be more autonomous with an increase of intra platform data management and
sharing; task distribution will shift from the operational user to the air vehicle and increased
autonomy will lead to SUAS swarming functionality. Swarming capability establishes a
paradigm shift in SUAS enabling new functionality: large scale mapping, coordinated attack, and
communication relays (Herrera et al., 2017). The improvements listed above all point to an
increase of operational mission sets for SUAS in the near future.
Design for Multiple Functions
One large benefit of UASs are their ability to be customizable and flexible to different
mission sets and functions. Size, weight, and power trades within the UAS architecture provide
options for the air vehicle to increase performance dependent on the mission set. One way this is
realized is through the ability to swap payloads to gain alternative functionality of
reconnaissance, munitions, night time imagery, environment measurement, payload delivery, etc.
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Different payloads can impact system weight, communication, level of autonomy, and
range requirement. These changes effect design and drive the need for modular adaptable
platforms to keep cost low and mission flexibility high. To achieve this platform flexibility “a
parameterized product line architecture can be used to capture system commonalities while
expressing variabilities in physical characteristics such as navigation, collision avoidance, flight
control, remote command and control, communication, and telemetry.” (Madni, 2012) . Madni
explains the system should be reconfigurable dynamically, enabling swappable components
without inducing failure modes.
The process of platform selection and final configuration would involve selection of an
overarching concept of operations (CONOP) which involves specific mission profiles. Then a
product line architecture (PLAS) is created which supports the various mission profiles, or a
family of profiles. PLAS promotes reduced time to deployment, reduced cost, increased
productivity, superior quality, simplified training, reduced logistics, increased competition, and
leverage of human capital (Madni, 2012).
Fricke and Schulz (2005) detail that the changeability of a system is distinguished by four
aspects: flexibility, adaptability, agility, and robustness. During the concept development phase
trades can be performed between these aspects to gain design options or trade space to better
align with operator requirements. Flexibility is defined as “the measure of how easily a system’s
capabilities can be modified in response to external change.”(Ryan, Jacques, & Colombi, 2013)
The first key components of this definition is the measure of ease, defined by Ryan (2010) as
time or money. The second is capabilities, defined as “value assessment of the desired system
characteristic” (Ryan et al., 2013). Values should align with system prioritized requirements.
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Adaptability is defined as “the measure of how effectively a system can modify its own
capabilities in response to change after it has been fielded” (Ryan et al., 2013). Critical to this
definition is the measure of how effectively the system can modify itself. Agility is contrasted
with adaptability, “the system’s ability to be change rapidly, where changes from external
sources must be implemented to cope with changing environment” (Fricke & Schulz, 2005).
Finally, robustness is “a systems ability to be insensitive towards changing environments, where
intended functionality is delivered under varying operating conditions” (Fricke & Schulz, 2005).
System design can influence the amount of robustness a system requires by defining the
operational criteria or bounds early in the design process. Figure 9 summarizes the four aspects
of changeability, showing that trades can be performed across the aspects to determine degree of
changeability required and the degree of external change allowed.

Figure 9. The Four Aspects of Changeability (Fricke & Schulz, 2005)
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Another critical concept in SUAS design is modularity. “Modules are units in a larger
system that are structurally independent of one another, but work together” (Baldwin & Clark,
2000). The SUAS’s frame is what provides an architecture to integrate modules to perform
functions and task. Modularity can mitigate system complexity by isolating systems to modules
which reliably perform their assigned tasks. Simple interfaces connect the modules together in a
manner which reduces task loading to the operator. Current examples of modules within SUASs
are propulsion system (motor and propeller pair), 4 in one electronic speed controllers, flight
computer, payloads, and GPS.
Modularity for a system is managed by six module operators. These operators are
implementation methods for design which enable functions of the system. The operators are:
splitting or segmenting into modules, substituting modules, adding modules, excluding modules,
creating new design rules, and connecting modules (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Benefits of
modularity in SUAS include: isolation of fault analysis to a component with proper
characterization, multiple component swaps at a given time for a design cycle or mission plan,
and flexibility for future tasks (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).
In additional to multiple functionality, SUASs have many target operators within the
DoD. The target career field for SUASs include: Security Forces, Civil Engineering, Special
Operations, Battlefield Airman, Firefighter, Office of Special Investigation, Intelligence, Combat
Camera, and Weather (U.S. Air Force, 2016). These groups of warfighters will use SUASs in
either duress or non-duress situations and in austere or non-austere locations.
A duress situation means the systems needs to be intuitive, rapidly deployable, and
highly reliable. Increased complexity, measured in time to gain functionality, is undesirable due
to the value weighting of the user’s time. Austere locations place emphasis on the characteristics
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of reliability, transportability, availability, ease of repair. Reliability can be allocated to
individual parts or subsystem driving factors of how many spare parts are required, mean time to
repair, and system design life. Furthermore, low reliability can stress the logistical system in
austere locations causing systems to be inoperable if supplies are inadequate.
Transportability can be allocated to system weight, size, modularity, and durability. The
system needs to be the right size and weight to be transported and then assembled at the location,
while still performing its required mission. System design life must also be considered; is the
system designed for 6 months or a year? If the system has a shorter lifespan have considerations
been established for system resupply? If the system has a longer lifespan what is the repair plan
like? These questions must be answered early in the design process to ensure functions correctly
for the operator.
Summary
This literature review has documented findings that provide system engineering input for
SUASs concept development. Focus was shown on developing critical system functions which
are in alignment with mission profiles. The concept development process success is heavily
dependent on identifying potential system faults and criticality of faults; these faults must then be
traced and assigned to subsystems or components for documentation. Reliability provides a
measure of probability the SUAS will perform a system function. The measurement of reliability
is performed at the component level and assimilated to the system level for given functions,
where increasing the number of components has a large effect on overall reliability.
Documentation was provided by NIST on current methodologies employed on measuring SUAS
reliability.
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Multirotor SUASs provide excellent platforms for system modularity, specifically the
number of motors/propellers and size. This enables agility and flexibility for the system for
evolving mission sets and unintended future uses. Modularity also promotes traceable reliability
to specific modules when coupled with fault analysis. When designing a SUAS, focus must be
paid to the operational user, their background, and the environment they will face. The system
must align with these characteristics to be useful tool. The better the match between the ease of
use of the system and multiple functionality, the better the system will perform. The mission set
is continuously evolving for SUASs and smart system design must be employed to harness new
technology and push the bound of operational effectiveness for the warfighter.
The next section of this paper, Chapter III, will discuss the methods for performing a
concept development for a SUAS. The chapter will outline how to define and appropriate
reference missions. Then it will detail the system engineering methodology used for the analysis
focusing on important aspects of design trades, critical faults, and functionality allocation. The
method section will discuss reliability rating for component and system level parts and how they
are found, measured, and documented.
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III. Methods
Chapter Overview
The goal of this thesis is to provide a Small Unmanned Aerial System (SUAS) product
development design template for military program offices, outputting critical SUAS components,
operator checklists, reliability analysis, and a hazard matrix to aid in the development of a
reliable SUAS that meets mission requirements. The product development process is split into
two sections, Mission/System Alignment and System Design. Mission/System Alignment
focuses on a generalized system engineering process to align stakeholder’s initial design criteria
with a reliable system design. This process develops operator checklists that mitigate critical
faults, promoting reliable system performance in operational conditions. The second section,
System Design, focuses on establishing trade space from developed requirements in the
Mission/System Alignment section, and follows a system design process to output a SUAS
design that meets established requirements. Both processes are meant to be repeatable and
simplistic using SUAS components and architectures that are available commercially. The
following chapter provides system engineering techniques and trades which enable the analysis
to be performed in Chapter 4.
Theory
The system engineering process is used to establish a methodology and progress through
a design analysis. Concepts include identification of stakeholder(s), development of a design
reference mission, system requirements, functional allocation, fault tree analysis, reliability
analysis, physical allocation, trade space analysis, and requirement analysis. The goal of the
process is to define a system that meets, at a minimum, threshold requirement aligned with
stakeholder definition.
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Figure 10 shows the Initial DoD System Engineering Process on which the SUAS
product design process was based. Process inputs involve customer or stakeholders needs,
mission type, mission environment, available technology, and project constraints. The
requirement analysis is used to translate customer requirements into functional and performance
requirements that can be measured and documented. Functional analysis allocates down system
functions to the lowest level and then maps those functions to documented requirements. This
process allows the system designer to understand what the system is doing and how it is doing it,
leading to selection and optimization of physical components. Design synthesis establishes a
physical architecture based on information from the requirement analysis and functional analysis.
Components must map to functions that then map to requirements, the process is iterative
balancing requirements with a functional architecture and physical design. System analysis and
control is used to measure the progress of the design alternatives against requirements. Inputs to
this process occur at all points within the system engineering process. The system analysis
ensures design impacts are measured, documented, traced, and evaluated providing critical
information for final design selection (DAU, 2017).

Figure 10. Initial DoD System Engineering Process Model (DAU, 2017)
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Material and Equipment
Modeling was the primary tool for developing the system, performing component trades,
and analyzing requirements. The system modeling tool used was Cameo Systems Modeler
version 18.5. This tool enabled the building and augmentation of various system level views.
Views documented include: System Functional Allocation, Physical Architecture, Internal Block
Diagram, and Use Case. These views from Cameo Systems Modeler are presented in analysis
section of this thesis. For predicting failure modes of the proposed SUAS architectures a free
fault tree analyzer was used to document fault traceability to components (ALD, 2018).
Microsoft Excel was leveraged to capture fault tree tables, document requirements, build
operator checklists, establish design trades, and perform component reliability analysis. Focus
was placed on using tools available to military program offices to ensure a repeatable and
distributable process.
Procedures and Process
The overall system design process is outlined in Figure 11. The process is split into two
sections. The first section is the Mission/System Alignment process which involves stakeholders
and a program office working together to define the mission and requirements for the SUAS
system, where the program office includes program managers and engineers. In this section, the
critical functions are defined by the program office, these are functions that must be performed
by the system to successfully complete the defined mission. Next, fault tree diagrams are used to
map the critical functions to components and identify potential failures. Fault tree diagrams
enable the program office and stakeholders to identify critical system components and to build
operator checklists. The operator checklists mitigate system risk prior to mission deployment of
the SUAS and ensure the most reliable in-flight performance. Program management tool outputs
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of this Mission/System Alignment are critical component reliability analysis and a hazard matrix
which promote system reliability monitoring.
The second section is the System Design. This process is performed by the program
office team once the design documents have been created. The design process involves building
a system physical architecture, a design checklist, and establishment of a design trade space.
These system level products provide an architecture, rule set, and trade space to select SUAS
componentry. The component selection process is cyclical and requires constant evaluation of
design trades and requirement evaluation. The system design process constrains componentry as
the design is matured. Once the system is designed, system budgets are developed for frequency,
weight, and power informing the requirements analysis process. Finally, the reliability analysis
performed in the Mission/System Alignment section paired with the physical architecture
provides input for a system reliability analysis. This process allows the program office and
stakeholders to own the technical baseline for the SUAS system, providing critical system level
architectures and analysis to inform future design decisions or design iterations.
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Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process
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Identify the Stakeholders
For the design process to be successful, the stakeholders of the system must be
understood. The main stakeholders in this design process are the operators of the systems, as
they have the most interaction with the system. For this design Special Forces operators are
considered the main stakeholder. An interview was conducted with USAF 371st Special
Operations Combat Training Squadron (SOCTS) Detachment 1, who performs user training for
DoD special operators, security contractor personnel, and security forces on SUAS platforms.
Initial design criteria discussed in this conversation included: low system weight, quick set up
time, low audible signature, intuitive use, quick reparability. Section IV will operationalize these
stakeholder requirements in more detail.
Define Design Reference Missions
The next step within the Mission/System Alignment section is to define reference
missions for the SUAS to be designed to. The design reference mission evaluated within this
paper is Information Superiority. This mission aligns the United States Air Force SUAS Flight
Plan: 2016-2036 and is focused on collecting enemy video surveillance for force protection,
offensive maneuvering, or general intelligence (U.S. Air Force, 2016). Design of the reference
mission is performed by the stakeholders and the program office to ensure the operators and
designers of the system are in complete alignment of mission priorities.
The reference mission defines an overall Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and operator
use cases for the system. These products provide a medium to transfer operator and design team
system mission definition into physical products. After these system documents are created,
design requirements are established for the system to be evaluated against. Requirements must be
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time bound, allowing for a stable evaluation points

37

for the designed system. Additionally, the performance requirements are defined at threshold and
objective level. Threshold levels must be met for the system to perform the mission while
objective levels are the desired capability from the stakeholder. Requirements are prioritized and
aligned with stakeholder initial design criteria. This places emphasis on certain design points
influencing important trades in the System Design process.
Critical Functions of the SUAS
After identifying the needs of the stakeholder and the mission set for the system, critical
functions can be established. Functions are designed and diagrammed within Cameo Systems
Modeler using a functional architecture model. Critical functions are defined as any function
which must occur to provide use or functionality to the operator. Use or functionality of the
system is then defined by the initial design criteria, the reference mission CONOPS, and
requirements. Top-level critical functions include: flight, operator control, and payload
capability. These functions must be all be realized by the system in order to provide use to the
stakeholders.
Failure Modes
With critical functions identified, failure modes can be defined and listed which prevent
the functions from occurring. Failure modes for SUASs were researched from hobbyist websites,
technical reports, and case studies. Criticality of occurrence falls into three categories. Category I
is an unrecoverable event, where SUAS system failure is imminent or repair time for the system
to regain functionality is unacceptable to the user. Category II is a functionality degraded event,
meaning the SUAS can perform system use cases albeit at a degraded level. Category III is a
recoverable event, meaning the SUAS can be recovered and repaired within a time acceptable to
a user. Fault tree diagrams and tables were developed to show traceability from a component to a
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critical function. Fault tree tables provide input to operator checklists, which the operator can
complete prior to flight to mitigate system risk. These checklists promote a reliable system by
eliminating operator, environmental, and component induced risks before flight.
Failure rates for critical components that induce category I events were researched.
Components investigated were motors, propellers, battery elimination circuits (BEC), electronic
speed controllers, lithium polymer batteries, flight computers, GPS, vehicle frames,
cameras/sensors (ESC), electrical systems, and radio receivers/transmitters. Failure rates were
documented as field events, researched events, or subject matter expert event. Failure rates are
listed as failures per hour and are static probabilities, assumed to be within the constant failure
rate of the bath tub curve (defined in Chapter IV). The assumption ignores infant mortality or
early component wear out, stressing that either the manufacture of the component or the user,
tests the components prior to system integration. Corresponding component reliabilities can be
aggregated for subsystems and evaluated in the physical architecture and integrated block
diagram steps for an overall system reliability. A hazard matrix was built combining the failure
rates of a component and the category of event to the system. The hazard matrix aids the
program office in making decisions that mitigate risks to critical system components.
Generate Checklists
Fault tree diagrams and tables provide insight into the failures for the SUAS system.
From these insights, operator checklists were developed to mitigate failures prior to mission
deployment. The checklists developed were a pre-flight checklist, a pre-deployment checklist, an
initial flight checklist, and a spares checklist. The pre-flight checklist is designed to be performed
at the deployment location before any flight; the checklist items requires a low time commitment
from the operator. The pre-deployment checklist is performed prior to forward deployment at a
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secure location and requires a medium time commitment from the operator. The initial flight
checklist is performed in a controlled environment when the baseline configuration of the SUAS
is altered. This checklist requires a high time commitment from the operator with the design
team’s assistance. The spares checklist is a recommended deployment kit to have if additional
transport weight is permitted. It is focused on providing replacement for components which
induce category I events.
Physical Architecture
The System Design process starts with creating a design checklist to inform the physical
architecture of the system. The design checklist provides a ruleset on components for the
program office to design the system in accordance with. This checklist is the most general of the
physical architecture products and provides best practices for designing multirotor SUASs. It
captures rules from the authors experience, online drone blogs, and members within AFIT’s
Autonomous Navigation and Technology (ANT) Lab.
The next product developed is the physical architecture. This diagram is built with
Cameo Systems Modeler and shows how the components within the SUAS connect and interact
with each other. The architecture provides a framework for the program office to identify critical
interaction and trades to increase system alignment with the requirements. The physical
architecture is meant to be modified throughout the system design process, as trades are
identified. A more specific view of the physical architecture is the internal block diagram (IBD).
This view identifies system ports which connect components, shows how information is
transferred within the system, and identifies central system nodes. The view provides valuable
insight into how design trades can be implemented and the potential impact to the system.
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Evaluating both the design checklist and physical architecture views against the design
documents reveals design trade space. The design trade space identifies architecture,
configuration, or component trades which the system designer can implement to increase certain
performance aspects of the system while decreasing others. As the program office progresses
through the system design process, they can go back to the design trade space to boost
performance areas that are below requirement threshold values. Each time a trade is accepted the
design team must ensure the physical architecture models are updated. This process is complete
when “builder thinks the system can be built to the client’s satisfaction” (Maier & Rechtin,
2009).
Component Selection
With the system architecture established components are then selected to fill the
architecture. Components that impact the architecture the most are selected first. Each successful
component selection constrains follow on component categories and may constrain none, one, or
many other component categories. The component selection process benefits from identification
of critical components completed in the Mission/System Alignment phase, as special attention is
paid to components that have the highest impact on failure modes. Importance is placed on
selecting components with trusted reputation among the commercial drone industry and
components that provide detail specification and test data for follow on analysis. As the program
office moves through the component selection process the overall system is refined and the
design trade space shrinks. Components evaluated for the multirotor SUAS are frames, motors,
ESCs, propellers, flight computers, video transmitters, camera systems, power systems, remote
control systems, and ground control station (GCS).
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Develop Budgets
With the components selected for the SUAS, budgets for weight, frequency, and power
are developed. The weight budget is important for transportation limits established within the
design requirement. The weight also is an important input to endurance calculations for the
designed system. The frequency budget ensures the remote control, flight computer, and video
transmitter systems are allocated within individual frequency bands, preventing command and
control errors within flight. The power budget determines the current draw (mA) and voltage
range (V) required for the system. Power levels determine the number and type of BECs required
for the system along with non-motor power demands of the system or auxiliary power draw. The
power budget also provides input into endurance calculations.
System Reliability
With the physical components selected and budgets established a reliability analysis is
then performed. Failure rates researched for critical components performed in the
Mission/System Alignment section are identified in the physical architecture, creating a
reliability block diagram for the SUAS system. For ease of calculations, the reliability block
diagrams are broken into subsystems based on critical functions. System components are either
in series or parallel configuration based on established requirements. Series configuration allows
for a lower system weight but puts the system at risk for a single point of failure. Parallel
configuration adds in redundancy for the system at the cost of higher weight and overall
complexity. Outputs of the reliability analysis are critical subsystem reliabilities, overall system
reliability, system mean time to failure (MTTF), and probability to complete operational the
mission.
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Requirements Analysis
The final step of the System Design process is to perform a requirements analysis. The
designed system is evaluated against requirements established in the Mission System/Alignment
phase. The analysis proceeds through each requirement and projects how the design system will
meet or fail to meet threshold and object values. Information for the analysis is collected from
component manufacturing specifications, online websites/blogs, and subject matter expert input.
Engineering calculations are required for certain requirements like flight endurance, image pixel
density, and video latency. If certain requirements are unable to be met by the current design, the
program office must revisit sections in the system design process to improve the design. If
program office personnel and the stakeholders approve the requirement analysis, the design can
move into production and system testing. This allows for the theoretical values of the
requirements analysis to be proven out by the system.
Conclusion
This section has outlined a product development process for a SUAS to be designed to a
specific reference mission and was detailed in two sections: Mission/System Alignment and
System Design. Mission/System Alignment focuses on mapping design criteria established by
system stakeholder to critical functions of the system. Critical functions of the system lend to
fault trees being established that help identify critical components and failure mode criticality.
The main output of this process is operator-based checklists, designed to mitigate risk to the
SUAS before flight. With user and environmental errors mitigated before flight, the system
reliability can be attributed to critical components that perform critical functions. These failure
rates for such components have been researched and documented in Chapter IV. System Design
focuses on establishing trade space from developed requirements in the Mission/System
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Alignment and following a system design process to output a specific system that meets
established requirements. This product development process is repeatable for any type of SUAS
mission, establishing a tool that can be used by program office to build reliable SUAS for
specific mission sets.
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IV. Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the implementation of the SUAS product development process
established in Chapter III. The overall product development process is show in Figure 11. Each
section of this chapter starts with a zoomed in figure of the step being addressed within the
process. Steps within the process are color coded according to participant involvement, red
involves stakeholders, purple involves stakeholders and the program office, and blue involves the
program office only. The product development process is split into two sections, Mission/System
Alignment and System Design. Mission/System Alignment focuses on a generalized system
engineering process to align stakeholder’s initial design criteria with a reliable system design.
This process develops operator checklists that mitigate critical faults, promoting reliable system
performance in operational conditions. The second section, System Design, establishes trade
space from developed requirements in the Mission/System Alignment section and follows a
system design process to output a specific system that meets established requirements. The
following chapter progresses through the SUAS product development process for an Information
Superiority mission focused on collecting enemy video surveillance for force protection,
offensive maneuvering, or general intelligence.

45

Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process
Mission/System Alignment
Identify the Stakeholders

Figure 12. Initial Design Criteria section of Mission/System Alignment
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USAF 371st Special Operations Combat Training Squadron (SOCTS) Detachment 1 performs
user training for DoD special operators, security contractor personnel, and security forces on
SUAS platforms. In an interview performed August 2018 with Detachment 1, system desires for
SUAS platforms were discussed. The conversation started with asking for recommendations for
the design methodology for SUASs specifically for special operator’s use. It was stated that the
current methodology of treating SUAS as aircraft focusing on airworthiness for long hours is
flawed since SUAS are orders of magnitude lighter and cheaper than traditional aircraft. SUAS’s
should instead be treated as tools. A tool focus allows for intuitive and reliable design focused on
very specific functions allowing for simple solutions to solve a mission need. Furthermore, teams
need to move away from dedicating one to two SUAS operators and embrace the flexibility of all
members performing SUAS operations. With his methodology stated operator design
requirements for a SUAS system were then discussed.
The first design requirement discussed was simplicity; special operators desire a system that
can be unpacked, assembled, and launched in a matter of minutes and operated with limited
initial training. Detachment 1 stated that there is a desire for the baseline military SUASs to be as
complicated as commercial off the shelf (COTs) drones, where the system is designed for an
average consumer and is flown within hours of purchase. This would allow 371st SOCTS to
focus on training the functionality of the system, including enhanced sensors, user interfaces,
software modules, etc.
The next design requirement detailed was the overall utility of the system. Utility of the
system must outweigh the detriments the system places on the operational user, specifically,
pack weight, setup time, and user involvement. This relationship drives a design which performs
a few functions well while minimizing user detriments.
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Another design requirement discussed was user dependency. Special operators do not want to
be overly reliant on a system. Over reliance can manifest itself in the form of interfacing with the
system reducing environmental situational awareness, recovery of the SUAS in order to continue
mission, and destruction of the SUAS to prevent enemy intelligence gathering. The special
operators should be able to continue and succeed with a degraded or destructed SUAS.
The final requirement discussed was betrayal. It was stated that the system shall prevent
betrayal of the special operation team, where the system mitigates detection by the enemy and
protects the operator. Prevention of betrayal includes a low audible signature, intelligence
preservation, and safe operations. The discussion above drove the initial design criteria, which
must be considered for a successful design.
1. Simplicity: the number of parts the operator must interact with to operate or repair the
system should be low and intuitive. The user interface to control the system shall have
critical functions only and be intuitive. Time is the operator’s most valuable resource.
2. Utility: Design focus shall be placed on performing one or two functions maximizing
reliability. A system that performs a large amount of functions at the expense of the
operator’s time, situational awareness, or mobility is valued lower than a system which
performs a few functions timely, simply, and lightly.
3. Dependency: Functions which are critical to mission success shall be able to be repaired
quickly. Recovery of the system needs to be optional due to increase threat presence.
Burden placed on the user from the system shall be minimized including recovery,
operation, setup, transport, deployment, and information transfer.
4. Betrayal: The system shall prevent betrayal to the special operations team. Mitigations
shall be integrated into the system to reduce noise footprint, intelligence preservation,
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rapid deploy and stow, and safe handling. If the system promotes increased risk to the
user, it reduces usefulness.
Define Design Reference Missions

Figure 13. Design Document Process

The mission selected for this analysis is Information Superiority or Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). In this mission a SUAS provides forward deployed
ground-based units the capability to conduct low altitude, ISR and human and vehicle tracking
operations from a safe standoff distance with minimal logistical support. Specifically, the use of
the SUAS will allow operators to:





Rapidly setup and deploy SUAS from austere location
Covertly loiter over a desired target area, providing uninterrupted, or nearcontinuous video coverage over a target for a 30-minute interval
Continuously track a moving human or vehicle within operating range
Utilize payloads optimized for low altitude operations capable of providing
sufficient resolution for target identification
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Monitor ISR data from safe standoff distance
Conduct Small UAS operations while maintaining situational awareness of the
location around the operator
Provide timely ISR data for ongoing/future ground operations

Figure 14 displays a SysML use case diagram created in Cameo Systems Modeler, showing the
set of actions or use cases the system will perform in conjunction with external users or actors of
the system. The system is only in one use case at a time but can transfer across cases. In the ISR
mission the use cases and actors are the following:
Actors: Operator, Target, Ground Control Station, GPS










Perform Setup: The operator secures the launch location, unpacks the SUAS and
required equipment. The operator assembles any required parts and perform setup
checklist.
Plan Mission: Included within the Perform Setup use case is the Plan Mission use
case. The operator programs the ground control station with desired mission
points and writes them to the SUAS flight computer. Plan mission is also included
in the Loiter, Launch and Ingress, Acquire Target, and Perform Setup use cases.
Where an include relationship is defined as “having some partial behavior that is
common across several use cases.” (Larman, 2006)
Launch and Ingress: Operator confirms GPS lock is acquired if required for
mission. Then the operator commands the SUAS to move to the first mission
point.
Loiter: This is the default case if the SUAS is not acquiring a target, performing
surveillance, performing ingress or egress. The SUAS loiters and transmits video
at a preprogramed altitude and awaits commands for the operator.
Acquire Target: The operator identifies target through the ground control station
and commands the SUAS to follow the target and perform surveillance.
Perform Surveillance: The SUAS streams video back to the operator of the target.
The SUAS follows the target as it moves within its operating radius.
Egress and Recover: SUAS is commanded by operator to return to base or land at
coordinate points. Failsafe mode of auto land or return to base if battery is below
5% is programed during Plan Mission phase.
Ditch: SUAS can be ditched at any time during an in-flight mission, preventing
betrayal to special operators. Ditch mode can be induced by the operator or preprogramed failsafe.
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Figure 14. ISR Use Case Diagram

The next step of defining a design reference mission is to establish and prioritize
requirements for the system to be designed to. Requirements have objective and threshold values
for the system. Objective requirements are desires or performance goals for the system to meet.
Threshold requirements must be met for the system to provide use to the operational user. The
space between objective and threshold requirements establishes design space for system trades.
Requirements should be established with input from the operational user, but the system designer
must ensure the requirements are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-related. The
design criteria defined by the operational user aids in prioritization of requirements. In the case
of the ISR system the user desires a system that is simple to use and set up, keeps them safe,
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performs ISR reliably, and operates independently. In prioritizing requirements, the user’s
perspective must be kept in mind. Since this system will be used by special operator in a
contested environment, time equates to life or death. In turn, from a system designer perspective
emphasis must be placed on those requirements that, if unmet, will force the user to abandon the
system.
Table 2 shows example ISR requirements with threshold and objective values.
Requirements were established and expounded from the AFIT SUAS design sequence, reference
CONOPS, which is provided in Appendix C. Each requirement is prioritized with a descending
priority. The first ten prioritized requirements are influence by the user’s design criteria of
simplicity, utility, dependency, or betrayal. Failure of meeting these ten requirements would
immediately prevent the user from using the system due to a mission safety concern. Therefore,
in designing the system these requirements must be considered first.
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Table 2. ISR Design Requirements
Requirement

Description

ISR-2
ISR-3

Setup of system from unpacking to
ready for launch shall be
Mission planning time from
coordinates provided to operator to
ready for launch
Operators required for setup

ISR-4

System shall have a range from
deployment location of

ISR-1

ISR-5
ISR-6
ISR-7

5 min

10 min

2

Simplicity

5 min

10 min

3
5

Simplicity
Dependency

2 miles

100% of
time

ISR-9

System shall require dedicated
operators for control and operations
Operator shall be able to identify
ground targets while controlling
vehicle

ISR-10

System shall display near real time
imagery to the operator(s)

2 sec delay

ISR-11

Operators required for recovery,
landing, and retrieval of the system

0

ISR-8

ISR-12
ISR-13
ISR-14
ISR-15
ISR-16
ISR-17
ISR-18
ISR-19

2
1 mile

11

30
pixels/

7

Utility

85% of
time
15 ft

8
17

Utility

1

Endurance of the system while
transferring video shall be
System shall perform "return launch"
if communication is lost with
operator
System shall indicate to operator if
GPS is lost and allow for manual
recovery mode
System shall provide status of
battery to operator

Design
Criteria

Threshold

1

System shall provide resolution for
tracking a vehicle
System shall loiter over the target
and provide 10 minutes video of
target for
System shall transmit geo-location to

Priority
Level

Objective

60 minutes

System altitude shall be greater than
100 ft except at launch and recovery
System shall have the capability
swapping in a night capable camera
of 0.001 LUX or lower
System shall have a low noise
profile of 50 db or lower at
minimum safe flight altitude
Air vehicle shall weigh less than 5kg
and be packable in 2 standard ruck
sacks 22" X 14" X 9"

2
X

10

5 sec delay

12

1

Dependency
Utility

18

45 minutes

9

X

15

X

14

X

13

X

19

X
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6

Utility

16
X

4

Betrayal

X

1

Utility

Critical Functions of the SUAS

Figure 15. Critical Function Process

Critical functions are defined as functions that must be performed for the SUAS to
provide capability to the operator. At the top level these functions are: Flight, Transport, Power,
Control, and Surveillance. If any of these functions are unable to be performed, then the entire
system is unusable for the operator. Figure 16 displays the functional allocation of the SUAS
system. The critical functions are broken down into different levels, with lower level functions
enabling the top-level functions. For example, the top-level function of flight is enabled by
generate lift, provide stability, launch, and recover. If one or more lower level functions are
unrealized for the system, then the top-level function is either unrealized or degraded.
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Functions colored green shown in Figure 16, are functions that attribute degraded
performance to top level functions if unrealized, while functions in light orange force the toplevel functions to be unrealized. In the instance of the top-level function of flight, when recovery
is unrealized then flight is degraded, meaning the function still has use to the operator.
Conversely, if generate lift is unrealized so too is flight and therefore the system unable to
provide capability to the operator. System design will focus on preventing failures for the lower
level orange functions or critical functions. Descriptions of each function are described in Table
3.
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Figure 16. Functional Allocation of ISR SUAS System
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Table 3. Functional Description of ISR SUAS System
Top Tier Function

Flight

Transport

Power

Surveillance

Control

Second Tier Function
Generate Lift

Description
SUAS shall create lift for a vantage point to
enable increased situational awareness for the
operator.

Provide Stability

SUAS shall remain stable while airborne enabling
controlled flight for the operator.

X

Launch

SUAS shall be commanded to launch by the
operator and transition from launch to flight.

X

Recover and Reuse

SUAS shall be commanded to recover by operator
and transition from flight to recovery/landing.

Pack and Store

SUAS shall be man packable for transport. SUAS
shall be assembled and disassembled from the
stored state and prepared for launch by operator.

X

Monitor
Distribute

Operator shall be able to monitor the power levels
of the SUAS while in flight.
SUAS shall distribute power to components.

X

Regulate
Store

SUAS shall regulate required voltage levels to
components
SUAS shall store energy on board the aircraft.

X
X

Observe Environment

SUAS requires sensor to visually observe the
environment.

X

Transmit and Receive

SUAS shall transmit sensor data down to the
operator.

X

Human Interface

Operator shall be able to process and record data
from the sensor including: GPS coordinates,
target type, speed, etc.

Payload Control

Operator shall have control over functions within
the payload i.e. movement, zoom, filter.

X

Flight Control

Operator shall have control over flight of the
SUAS.

X

Failsafe

SUAS shall have a failsafe programmed if control
is lost from the operator. Failsafe’s include return
to launch point, auto land, or self-destruct.

X

Guidance

SUAS shall have GPS guidance system for semiautonomous flight.

Provide Status

Operator shall receive status from the SUAS
including air speed, altitude, heading, and current
flight mode.
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Critical
X

Fault Tree Analysis

Figure 17. Failure Mode Analysis

Critical functions of the SUAS were then placed into Fault Tree Analysis diagrams
enabling the following benefits to the conceptual design process (Schenkelberg, 2018):






Identification of failures deductively through sequencing of events
Highlighting important elements of the system in relation to system failure
Establishing figures for system analysis
Evaluating failure modes one at a time
Revealing system behavior and interactions

Failures are attributed to system components and assigned categories. Three categories were
established which measure the impact or criticality to the overall system if the failure occurs.
Category I is an unrecoverable event, meaning the SUAS can no longer be flown with system
failure imminent. Repair time for the system to regain functionality is too high for the operator to
accept. The amount of time is dependent on operational conditions; in a contested environment
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the allowable repair time will be lower than in a non-contested environment. Category II is a
functionality degraded event, meaning the SUAS can perform system use cases, albeit at a
degraded level. Category III is a recoverable event; repair time required is within tolerance for
the operator. From an operator’s perspective, category I events end the mission for the SUAS
and must be prevented. Category II events may be tolerated by the operator depending on the
system degradation. For example, an intolerable event would include a gain tuning failure for
stable flight control between the ground control station and flight computer which degrades
flight control to the point that stable video is unable to be viewed at threshold level of 85% loiter
time. An example of a tolerable event would be if the remote-control feature of the air vehicle
failed but the autopilot mode still functioned. Category III events may be resolved by the system
itself or with assistance from the operator via recovery, or transmitted command. For mitigated
impact to the operator, time is evaluated. An example would be a GPS failure due to
environmental effects which resolves by flying the aircraft away from the degraded region within
an acceptable time based on operational conditions. Category III events can elevate to category II
or I events if left unmitigated. For purposes of this analysis category I failure prevention is
focused on first, followed by categories II and III.
Fault tree diagrams for each critical function are located in Appendix A. Probabilities for
specified failures within components are set to 0 as a placeholder since data exist for only
component failures and not specified events. Table 4 through Table 20, display the fault tree
diagrams in table form. The tables display the criticality of the failure, the failure, and if the
failure is a checklist item. An X mark in the checklist item column indicates a majority of the
system risk can be mitigated by a low time commitment inspection or test. A / mark means a
larger time commitment is required to mitigate risk. For example, in the Generate Lift Fault Tree
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Table, Table 4, the poor attachment failure, attributed to the motor component, can be mitigated
by a physical inspection of the motor attachment before flight, denoted by an X. The large
propeller failure, attributed to the motor component, requires detailed motor propeller testing to
reveal any overheating issues that may arise, denoted by a /. This test requires a longer time
commitment and analysis opposed to simply checking a motor attachment.
The generate lift fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 4.
Generating lift requires nominal performance from motors, propellers, ESCs, and the flight
computer. Design redundancy in motors, propellers, and ESCs can reduce the criticality of a
component failure from I to II. A design implementation of this redundancy is a hexarotor or 6
motor system. This design can tolerate a failure in up to two motors, ESCs, and/or propellers and
still achieve flight, albeit degraded. Conversely, a quad rotor system can only perform flight with
all motors, ESCs, and propellers functioning nominally.
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Table 4. Flight: Generate Lift Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

Failure Level 1

Failure Level 2

Faulty Wiring
Manufacturing Defect
Poor Attachment

I: if Four motors or
less else II

I: if Four motors or
less else II

I: if Four motors or
less else II

I

Motor Failure

ESC Failure

Propeller Failure

Flight Computer
Failure

Overheating

Life Span
Failed Bearing
Infant Mortality
Surge of Current
Manufacturing Defect
Infant Mortality
Contact with Equipment
Improper Mounting
Damage from Contact
Infant Mortality
Manufacturing Defect
Life Span
Environment
Surge of Current

Checklist Item
X

Large Propeller
Frame Vibrations
Poor Center of Gravity
Long Mounting Screws
Level
Environment

X
/
/
/
X
X
/
/
/
/
/
X
X
X
/
/
/

The provide stability fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 5.
Frame failure is a criticality value of I, as any large change in frame structural support will
induce flight failure. A propeller component failure in the form of a wrong propeller direction is
a criticality of III, since the air vehicle will not takeoff and requires little time to fix. All other
component failure modes can range in criticality from I-III. The level of criticality is largely
dependent on the operator’s familiarity with the system, the ability to recognize irregularities,
and the level of the error. An example of this is a center of gravity imbalance, if the air vehicle
takeoffs, an experience operator will recognize and issue and land the air vehicle immediately.
Although if the level of center of gravity issue is high or the operator in inexperienced, the air
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vehicle will take off and immediately crash. Many of these issues can be mitigated by pre-flight
checklists.
Table 5. Flight: Provide Stability Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

I

Frame Failure

I-III

Center of Gravity

III
I-III
I-III
I-III
I-III

Propeller
Motor Mount
Flight Computer
ESC
Payload
N/A

I-III

Failure Level 1
Over Flexibility
Crack Propagation
Loose Fasteners
Baseline
Payload Modularity
Frame Level
Shift in Flight
Wrong Prop Direction
Poor Mounting
Poor Gain Tuning
Wrong Mode
Excess Weight
Environment

Checklist Item
X
/
X
X
X
X
X
X
/
X
X
/

The launch fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 6. Operator
failures within the table benefit from a well-trained operator on the representative system and a
checklist. Training combined with pre-flight checklists enables the operator to identify
irregularities in the system and component, preventing criticality level I failures. Environmental
effects and assembly errors can be mitigated by checklists and training but require operator
experience. Component level errors and auto takeoff are attributed to failures within components
and software.
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Table 6. Flight: Launch Fault Tree Table
Criticality

I-III

I-III
I-III
I-III

Component

Operator

Various
Flight
Computer
N/A

Failure Level 1
Error in
Assembly
Collision
Setup
Flight Error
Component
Error
Auto Takeoff
Error
Environment

Checklist Item
/
X

/

The recover and reuse fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 7.
The criticality of failures are all level I since the if they occur the mission is ended, as the aircraft
is no longer airborne and/or is unable to be reused. These failures are acceptable if the operator
has completed the mission to satisfaction, or if the mission requires termination due to a threat.
Emphasis in recover and reuse is the prevention of betrayal. The system shall not reveal the
operator’s location or provide intelligence to an adversary.
Table 7. Flight: Recover and Reuse Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

I

Various:
Destructive Crash

I

Operator

I
I
I
I
I

Frame
Flight Computer
Sensor
Landing Gear
Various

Failure Level 1
Battery Depletion
Collision
Ditch
Environment
Operational Decision
Ground Effects
Frame Failure
Flight Comp Failure
Sensor Failure
Landing Gear Failure
No Spares

Checklist Item
X
/

/
/
/
/
/
/

The pack and store fault tree table, part of the transport functionality, is shown in Table 8.
Transporting the SUAS at an appropriate weight to the field is critical to use the system.
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Damaged components due to transport can be replaced in most cases with a dedicated spares kit
but in extreme conditions the vehicle may be unrepairable. System design should allocate weight
and space for required spares, if possible. The SUAS should be packaged in a manner that allows
for deployment in a timely manner based on mission, preventing system betrayal to the user.
Table 8. Transport: Pack and Store Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

I

Rucksack/SUAS

I-III

Various

II

Various

I-III

Various

II

Various

Failure Level 1
Unable to
Breakdown
Unable to Configure
Excess Weight
Damaged
Components
Fail to Deploy in
Time
Damaged Support
Equipment
Inability for Spares

Checklist Item
X
X
X

X

X

The monitor fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 9.
Monitoring the battery information is a critical piece of information for the operator in
determining mission duration. Dependent on system architecture, the battery information can be
collected by the sensor and/or flight computer. This information is then passed through
transmitters on the SUAS to the receiver on the GCS for the user to view. Monitoring the battery
levels is level II criticality since the mission can continue at a degraded state without the
information. In this case more risk is placed on operator awareness to know the endurance
limitations of the system.
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Table 9. Power: Monitor Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

II: If redundant or
failsafes

Transmitter/
Receiver

II: If redundant or
failsafes

Flight Computer

II: If redundant or
failsafes

Sensor

I

Battery

Failure Level 1

Checklist Item

Out of Range
Signal Noise
Wrong pairing
Faulty
Faulty Wiring
Bad Data
Incorrect Wiring
Faulty Wiring
Bad Data
Incorrect Wiring

/
X
/
/
/
/
/
/

Depleted

The distribute fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 10. The
SUAS must provide power to enable critical functions. If the battery is depleted the mission will
end, and in most cases will induce a fatal crash of the SUAS. A wiring and circuit fault can range
in criticality. This criticality is dependent on the operator recognizing the issue and mitigating it
as soon as possible. Pre-flight checklists are focused at mitigating these two failures while the
vehicle is on the ground before flight. Once airborne, these failures are more likely to induce
level I or II criticality.
Table 10. Power: Distribute Fault Tree Table
Criticality
I

Component
Battery

I-III

Wiring

I-III

Circuits

Failure Level 1
Depleted
Faulty
Incorrect Wiring
Disconnected
Wire
Cut Wire
BEC Failure
ESC Failure
PDU Failure
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Checklist Item
X
/
X
/
/
/
/

The regulate fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 11.
Critical components must receive the correct voltage and current from the power supply to
perform their functions. Redundancy for BEC and ESCs can mitigate the criticality of the failure
but at the cost of system weight and complexity. In turn, to maximize endurance, BEC and ESC
are usually single points of failure resulting in motor, flight computer, or sensor issues. Battery
and grounding component failures will cause an unrecoverable system failure.
Table 11. Power: Regulate Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

III: if redundant
else I

BEC/ESC

I
I

Battery
Various

Failure Level 1

Checklist Item

Bad Soldering
Burst Current
High Current
Infant Mortality
Manufacture
Error
Depletion
Grounding Issue

/
X

/
X

The store fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 12. Storing
power is performed by a battery attached to the vehicle’s frame. If the air vehicle is unable to
store power the mission will end. Increased risks for lithium polymer battery failure include
punctured battery, depletion past 80% life, overcharge/undercharge, to many charge cycles, and
poor wiring connection. The operator must pay attention to securing the battery to the frame via
storage bay, Velcro, fasteners, etc. All failures can be mitigated by checklist items.
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Table 12. Power: Store Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

I

Battery

I

Battery + Frame

Failure Level 1
Depleted
Punctured
Overcharge
End of Life
Poor Connection
Undercharge
Unsecure

Checklist Item
/
/
X
X
X
X
X

The observe environment fault tree table, part of the surveillance functionality, is shown
in Table 13. The SUAS must observe the environment to satisfy the ISR mission. Any fault that
prohibits the sensor on the SUAS from working eliminates the usefulness for the operator. These
failures can be attributed to the sensor itself, power to the sensor, the environment, or the
configuration of the sensor. A sensor gimbal allows the operator to independently control the
camera from the air vehicle. If the gimbal fails, the sensor will still can observe the environment
but requires the air vehicle to get in the correct position.
Table 13. Surveillance: Observe Environment Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

I

Sensor Defect

I

Sensor Environment

I

Sensor Configuration

II

Gimbal

Failure Level 1
Infant Mortality
Manufacture Defect
Wiring
Lens Fog
Wrong Sensor
Altitude
Poor Look Angle
Interference
Lens Focus
Data Rate
Obstructed View
BEC Failure
Servo Failure
Lock

Checklist Item

Wiring Issue

/
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/
X

/
/
/
X
/
/
/

The transmit and receive fault tree table, part of the surveillance functionality, is shown
in Table 14. To give the operator an enhanced visual perspective the imagery must be transmitted
from onboard sensor to the GCS. Transmitter and receiver errors occur when there is information
being transferred, the air vehicle is out of range, or there are component level failures. The
antennas must be paired correctly together at the same frequency and place in correct orientation.
Body masking from the air vehicle and the environment can impact the antenna and the quality
of transmission. If the sensor architecture is dependent on a BEC for a stepdown of voltage, then
it must perform to allow transmission. The operator must ensure the sensor is properly connected
to the transmitter or output source.
Table 14. Surveillance: Transmit and Receive Fault Tree Table
Criticality

I

Component
Transmitter /
Receiver

Failure Level 1

Checklist Item

Out of Range

/

Transmit Error
Low Bandwidth

/

Receive Error
Masking

/

Wrong Antenna

X

Broken Antenna

/

II/III

Antenna

I

BEC

BEC Failure

/

II/III

Sensor Config

Poor Connection

/

I

GCS

Power Issue

/

II/III

N/A

Interference

/

The human interface fault tree table, part of the surveillance functionality, is shown in
Table 15. For surveillance to be successful the operator must be able to receive the sensor feed
from the SUAS; this is done through the GCS. The GCS can fail by either hardware or software
issues. In most cases a software issue will only degrade functionality of this system, assuming all
pre-deployment checklist items are completed. While hardware failures like loss of power,
broken screen, or weather damage will render surveillance capability inoperable. Training is
68

important to the human interface function, since wrong inputs to the GCS can reduce the
functionality of the system. Training time and functionality should be balanced with GCS
complexity to ensure the system is simple enough to perform required tasks but also robust
enough to allow for operator decision making.
Table 15. Surveillance: Human Interface Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

II

Software
GCS

I

Hardware
GCS

II

Operator

Failure Level 1
No User Input
Bad Update
Glitch
No Power
Broken Screen
Weather Damage
Improper
Command
Complexity

Checklist Item
X
X
X
X
/

X

The sensor control fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 16.
Control of the sensor is important to detect and track items of interest from the SUAS. The
gimbal controls and stabilizes movement of the sensor independent of the air vehicle. A gimbal
failure degrades functionality and places more stress on the operator to maneuver the air vehicle
to capture the desired information. Transmission of control is done through the GCS. If a failure
occurs the air vehicle can still be positioned via remote control to capture information. The
sensor and its components must be in working condition for successful control. If the lens is
fogged or improperly connected, no level of control will mitigate this failure. In addition, the
sensor and its power must be functioning properly for control the be effective. Pre-flight
checklist largely mitigates these potential failures.
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Table 16. Control: Sensor Control Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

II

Gimbal

II

GCS

I-III

Lens

I

Power/Battery

I

Sensor

Failure Level 1
BEC Failure
Lock
Wiring Issue
Transmit/Receive
Servo Failure
Software Issue
Hardware Issue
Transmit/Receive
Operator Issue
Processing Issue
Poor Lens
Connection
Lens Fog
GCS Power Failure
Payload Power
Poor Connection
Infant Mortality

Checklist Item
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
X
/
/
/
X

Manufacture Defect

The flight control fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 17.
This fault tree table assumes there are two control nodes within the SUAS system. The first node
is the remote-control node consisting of a transmitter, controlled by the operator, and a receiver
on the air vehicle. The second node is the autopilot node consisting of a transmitter, controlled
by the GCS, and a receiver on the air vehicle. In this configuration one node can fail and system
performance is only degraded. For example, if the autopilot fails, the operator now must control
the air vehicle manually without preprogramed commands. This degrades the operator’s
situational awareness and puts them at a higher level of risk. The hub of all control on the air
vehicle is the flight computer. It processes commands from both the remote control and GCS. If
the flight computer fails, the system is no longer controlled, and a failsafe will be activated.
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Table 17. Control: Flight Control Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

Failure Level 1

Transmitter
II: If system has
both autopilot
and RC else I

Remote Control
Components

Receiver

Transmitter
II: If system has
both autopilot
and RC else I

Autopilot Components

Receiver

I for all except
gain tuning II

Flight Computer

Software Issue
Motor Wiring
Infant Mortality
Gain tuning
Excess
Vibrations

Failure Level 2

Checklist Item

Frequency
Antenna Position
Depleted Power
Wrong Input
Low Signal
Software Issue
Manufacture Defect
Antenna Issue
Payload Interaction
Wiring Issue
Range
Manufacture Defect
Not Paired

X
/
/

Manufacture Defect
Orientation Issue
Poor Link w/GCS
Poor Pair
w/Receiver
Wiring Issue
Antenna Issue
Range
Wiring Issue
Manufacture Defect
Payload Interaction

/
/
/
X
/
/
X
/
/
X
/
/
/
/
X
/
/
/
/

The failsafe fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 18.
Failsafes are operator programmed flight modes that activate when link is lost between the GCS
and/or the remote control. Flight modes include but are not limited to return to base, hover, selfdestruct, or land. A failure of a failsafe is defined as the air vehicle performing a flight mode that
is unexpected or not commanded. This can occur by incorrect programming of failsafes by the
71

operator including the wrong return to base location, wrong failsafe, or unprogrammed failsafe.
Additionally, the air vehicle may be unable to complete the command due to an object within its
path or a recovery issue. Finally, the flight computer may think there is a failsafe command when
there is not, type I error or the flight computer does not perform a failsafe when it is commanded,
type II error.
Table 18. Control: Failsafe Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

I-III

Operator/GCS

I or III

Air Vehicle

I or II

Flight
Computer

Failure Level 1
Unprogrammed
Wrong Failsafe
Wrong RTB
Object in Failsafe
path
Hard Landing
Type I Error

Checklist Item
X
X
X
/

Type II Error

The guidance fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 19.
Guidance is required for the autopilot to function correctly. With a dual control mode in the
system architecture a guidance failure only degrades the performance of the SUAS, since the air
vehicle can still be controlled by the remote control. The GPS enables positioning for the air
vehicle and provides location information via the GCS to the operator. GPS can be degraded by
conditions including a GPS denial environment, urban canyons, power lines, or large metal
objects. The air vehicle can also mask the GPS signal depending on the frequency and power of
signals emanating from the platform, placement of antennas, and electromagnetic interference
from the selected sensor or components. The Initial Flight checklist is focused on mitigating
these failures.
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Table 19. Control: Guidance Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

II

II
II
II

GPS

Transmitter/
Receiver
Air Vehicle
Sensor

Failure Level 1
Environment
Masking
Poor Connection
Manufacturing
Defect

Checklist Item

Range
Frame Masking
Jamming GPS

/
X
X

/
X

The provide status fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 20.
The flight computer provides flight information to the GCS including altitude, speed, flight
mode, heading, pitch, GPS, signal strength. These data categories are important to monitor the
performance of the air vehicle for mission execution and irregularities. The air vehicle can still
perform without this information but at a higher burden on the operator to identify performance
issues. Issues can arise from the GCS software of hardware, flight computer, or operator error
with the GCS interface.
Table 20. Control: Provide Status Fault Tree Table
Criticality

Component

II

GCS

II

II

Flight
Computer
Operator

Failure Level 1
Display
Software Issue
Wiring Telemetry Issue
No GPS Data
Transmitter/Receiver
Issue
Data not Configured
Obscured Data
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Failure Level 2
Broken Screen
Power
Hidden Data

Checklist Item
X
X
/
/
/
/
/
X
/

Reliability Analysis

Figure 18. Critical Components and Reliability Analysis Process

Probability of failure for SUAS components were researched. Limited information exists
on failures of critical SUAS components due to rapid advancement of components, diversity of
components, and relatively low costs. Components that induce Category I event failure include
motors, propellers, flight computer, ESC, BEC, transmitter, receiver, sensor, battery, frame, and
GCS. Table 21 provides a summary of failure rates for these components that were researched
and documented from online sources.
Failure rates are in failures per hour and are grouped based on components. Average
failure rates are displayed for common component categories. For example, the average failure
rate from the data collected for flight computers is 4.46 ∗ 10

failures per hour. All like

component failure rates are used for average failure, except the receiver system which is in bold
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text under the part column. This failure rate of 0.37 failures/hr was excluded since the failure
would be observed on a majority of missions, therefore is not an acceptable part and would be
replaced with a more reliable system.
Failures for components are assumed to be past the infant mortality phase and occur
within the constant failure rate zone of the bathtub curve. At a constant failure rate, the
components are in normal life of the bathtub curve and have had burn-in performed to remove
early life errors. Figure 19 shows the bathtub curve for electronics. These failure rates can be
applied to a representative multirotor system for a system level reliability and mean time to
failure. This is performed in the System Design section of the SUAS product process.
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Table 21. Failure Rates for Category I Components
Part
Flight Computer
Flight Computer

Failure
rate/hr
1.50E-02
1.57E-03

Average

Condition

4.46E-03

Field
Research

Flight Computer

1.25E-04

Research

Flight Computer

4.94E-05

Research

Flight Computer
Flight Computer
Motor

1.00E-02
2.00E-05
1.00E-04

Research
Lab
Lab

Motor

1.00E-04

Lab

Motor
Motor

5.00E-03
2.20E-03

Observed
Research

Motor
Propeller
Propeller
Propeller

5.56E-04
8.33E-04
3.40E-03
5.00E-02

Rotor
(motor+prop)
Frame

4.00E-02
5.00E-04

Frame
Frame
Batteries
Batteries
Batteries
Batteries
Batteries
ESC
ESC
BEC
BEC

2.07E-04
4.00E-03
2.00E-05
1.40E-03
5.00E-04
8.76E-06
1.00E-02
2.00E-04
2.50E-02
1.10E-03
6.67E-04

Receiver
Receiver

2.60E-03
7.14E-04

Receiver
Receiver
System

1.53E-04

Research

3.70E-01

SME

1.59E-03

1.81E-02

1.57E-03

4.77E-03

1.26E-02
1.77E-03
1.16E-03

Research
Research
Research
SME
Research
Research
Research
SME
Lab
Research
Research
Research
SME
Research
SME
Research
Research
Research
Research
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Comment
Pixhawk 1-quote
from 3DR Chris
Anderson
Based on sub
components: Gyro
Accel and filter, low
reliability
Based on sub
components: Gyro
Accel and filter, high
reliability
Common electronics
After infant mortality
Crowd source data
collect

FOD Contact
Combined Motor and
Propeller subsystem

Crack Propagation

Entire radio system,
outlier
With interference
from NPRD-2016
Entire radio system,
outlier

Source
(Thompson & Anderson,
2016)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Pashchuk, Salnyk, &
Volochiy, 2017)

(Pashchuk et al., 2017)
(Breunig et al., n.d.;
Stockwell & Schulman,
2016)
(O’Reilly, 2017)
(O’Reilly, 2017)
(“Phantom 1 MTBF,”
2016)
(Moore, 2018)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Wang, Mao, & Wei,
2018)
(Wang et al., 2018)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Kevorkian, 2016)
(Aslansefat, Marques,
Mendonça, & Barata,
2017)
(Wang et al., 2018)
(Abdallah, Kouta, Sarraf,
Gaber, & Wack, 2018)
(Kevorkian, 2016)
(O’Reilly, 2017)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Wang et al., 2018)
(Abdallah et al., 2018)
(Kevorkian, 2016)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Kevorkian, 2016)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Wang et al., 2018)
(Reimann et al., 2013)
(Wang et al., 2018)
(Abdallah et al., 2018)
(Kevorkian, 2016)

Failure
rate/hr

Part
Blackfly S
Camera
Camera

GCS

GCS

6.32E-07
2.00E-05

8.55E-04

3.00E-03

Average
1.03E-05

1.93E-03

Condition
Mobile
environme
nt
Lab
Representa
tive
Environme
nt
Representa
tive
Environme
nt

Comment
5 hr Burn In @50C
1 yr life at 4 missions
a week at 1.5 hr
missions, 2.4%
Failure per year,
Panasonic
Toughbook
1 yr life at 14
missions a week at
1.5 hr missions, 2.4%
Failure per year,
Panasonic
Toughbook

Source
(“Blackfly S Color 1.3 MP
USB3 Vision (ON Semi
PYTHON 1300),” 2018)
(O’Reilly, 2017)

(Panasonic, 2009)

(Panasonic, 2009)

Figure 19. Bathtub Failure Rates for Electronics (Wilkins, 2002)
With failure rates and categories of failures defined, a hazard/reliability matrix can be
defined to show the impact to the overall system if a specific component fails. The matrix takes
the failure rate for a given component and the category/impact of failure and then defines the
level of risk to the system. Risk focus areas are mitigating components that induce high and
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medium-high risk areas. Figure 20 shows the hazard/reliability Matrix with operational
definitions for categories, failure rates, and risks. Figure 21, then places the category I

1.00E-02
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06

Risk

1.00E-02
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06

Low
Low Medium
Medium High
High

Qualitative Assessment
Likely to occur within a month of operation
Will occur several times in the life of the air vehicle
Likely to occur once in the life of the air vehicle
Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of the air vehicle
It can be assumed that the occurrence will not happen

Figure 20. Hazard/Reliability Matrix
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components into the matrix aligned with average researched failure rates.

I

Prop, ESC
Motor, Flight
Comp, Frame,
Battery, BEC,
Receiver, GCS

1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06

Camera

Figure 21. Hazard/Reliability Matrix with Critical Parts
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Generate Checklists

Figure 22. Generate Operator Checklist Process

Four checklists are generated from inputs from the fault tree diagrams and identification
of critical components. Checklist are designed to mitigate risks to the system before operational
flights. Each checklist rule is attributed to SUAS component and category. Additionally, benefits
to each checklist rule are listed that detail which failures are mitigated. The first checklist is the
pre-flight checklist, meant to be performed before each mission. This checklist is designed to be
a low time commitment inspection that the operator can perform, mitigating X checklist items
generated in the fault tree tables. Examples within this checklist include visual inspection of
components for damage, securing of fasteners and components, center of gravity, proper wiring,
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and propeller clearance. The pre-flight checklist, shown in Table 22, should be performed on
scene and once the SUAS is assembled to ensure failures were not induced from transportation.

Table 22. Pre-Flight Checklist
Component

Category

Motor

Attachment

Motor

Wiring

Motor

Leveling

Motor

Defect Check

Propeller

Attachment

Propeller

Defect Check

Propeller

Size

Propeller

Contact

Frame
Frame

Stiffness/Secure
Leveling

Frame

Landing Gear

Wiring

Connections

ESC

Defect Check

Battery

Charge

Battery

Damage

Checklist Rules
Ensure motors are properly attached to
frame, secure all fasteners. Ensure fasteners
are not touching motor coils.
Ensure motor are wired properly, connected
to ESCs and flight computer. Ensure wires
are secured and in good condition.
Ensure motors are level to frame.
Ensure motor spins freely without
resistance. Listen for any rubbing. Inspect
coils and magnets for any damage.
Ensure propellers are properly attached to
motors and have the correct direction of
rotation.
Ensure there are no defects in the
propellers, minor nicks are ok. Inspect for
delamination and cracks.
Ensure propellers are the correct size for
the motors.
Ensure all propellers are clear of wires and
components. 1/4" clearance is desired for
frame flex. Secure potential contact items.
Check for loose fasteners, loose arms, and
overall frame stiffness. Place weight on the
frame and listen for any creaking sounds to
inspect for frame cracks. Tighten fasteners
and components if required.
Ensure frame is level ground.
Ensure landing gear are stable and solid
with required weight. If landing gear
retracts, cycle through procedure to ensure
functionality.
Ensure all wires are connected into flight
computer and required components
(motors, ESC, battery, payload). Check for
any improper wiring. Check battery
connection polarity.
Check ESC for loose soldering or poor
connections.
Ensure battery is the correct cell count,
capacity, and is fully charged.
Ensure battery is free from punctures or
frayed connections.
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Benefits
Prevents motor detachment
and overheating in flight
and ensures stable flight
Prevents motor power
failure in flight
Prevents overheating,
enables stable flight
Motor is properly
functioning for stable flight
Prevents propeller
detachment and ensure
stable flight
Prevent propeller failure in
flight
Prevents motor overheating
and degraded flight
Prevents cut wires or
destroyed components
Enables stable flight and
reduces probability of
induced crash
Promotes stable takeoff

Prevents landing failure
Ensures communication
and power are distributed
across vehicle safely.
Prevents ESC and flight
failure
Prevents shortened
endurance and flight
failures
Prevents in flight battery
failure

Component

Category

Battery

Secure

Frame

Center of Gravity

Payload/Sensor

Secure

Payload/Sensor

Lens

Flight Computer

Defect Check

Receiver

Antenna

BEC

Defect Check

Environment

Envelope

Environment

Flight Path

Checklist Rules
Ensure battery is secure to the frame and
wires are free from contact.
Hold the air frame along rotation axis and
ensure aircraft is balanced. If unbalance
shift battery, payload, or components.
Ensure sensor and components (lens) are
properly connected to frame. Field of view
of payload should not be blocked by frame.
Cabling should be plugged in a secure.
Ensure lens is connected to camera and is
not cracked or fogged.
Ensure proper power supply from battery,
secure to frame, and secure cabling.
Ensure antenna is correct for receiver is
clear of propeller and plugged in before
powering. If dual antennas position one in
horizontal frame and one in vertical frame.
Check incoming cabling for defects and
inspect BEC for any damage.
Ensure the current and forecasted weather
is within the performance envelope for the
configured air vehicle. Document wind
speed, gust speed, precipitation,
temperature, and humidity levels.
Evaluate surroundings for planned flight
path. Check for obstacles within path.
Identify power lines, metal buildings, or
large objects which can interfere with
signals.

Benefits
Prevents CG shift in flight
or loss of battery
Promotes stable flight and
maximum endurance
Enables proper
functionality of sensor for
mission
Enables proper
functionality of sensor for
mission
Proper functionality for
mission
Proper placement ensures
maximum control range
Promotes proper voltage
for all critical components
Promotes expected flight
performance. Provides data
for environmental impacts
for flight analysis

Mitigates command and
control loss

Next is the pre-deployment checklist, this checklist occurs before deployment to the
mission location due to the larger time commitment. The pre-deployment checklist is shown in
Table 23. The checklist ensures the SUAS is performing its designed functionality while on the
ground in a stable environment allowing for simplified troubleshooting from the operator. The
checklist provides possible failure modes for unsuccessful checks for operator troubleshooting.
Examples within the checklist include initial component check, range check, flight computer
calibration, system power check, and GCS mode check.
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Table 23. Pre-Deployment Checklists
Component

Multiple

RC Transmitter

Category

Initial Function
Check

Distance check

GPS

Lock

Flight Computer

IMU/compass
calibration

RC
Transmitter/GCS

Sensor

Mode Check

Function check

Sensor

Frequency Test

Sensor

Movement

Checklist Rules
Plug in all batteries to
the aircraft. Ensure no
smoking wires, burning
smells, or odd noises. If
these exist immediately
unplug and troubleshoot.

Ensure the RC receiver
on the aircraft receives
command from the
transmitter at minimum
of 100 yards on the
ground.
Ensure GPS has satellite
lock for more than 30
seconds and is stable.
Check for Satellite count
(min 6) and HDOP
values (1-2 m standard).
Calibrate IMU/compass
within flight computer.
Toggle flight modes on
flight computer and
confirm modes on GCS
software i.e. position
hold, altitude hold etc.
Establish connection
with sensor and ensure
data is being transferred
to GCS. Evaluate quality
of data and any changes
required to sensor.
Power up sensor,
transmitter, and receiver
to transmit video. Ensure
air vehicle is a short
distance from GCS.
Cover transmitter and
receiver antenna and
ensure no degradation in
video.
Command movement of
the sensor through GCS
ensure functionality and
confirm data.
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Possible Failures
Wiring issue, wrong
batteries, damaged battery,
depleted battery, poor
grounding.

Sensor jamming RC
controls, wrong
receiver/transmitter pair,
low transmitter battery,
damage receiver/transmitter,
receiver masking,
environmental effects, poor
wiring

Benefits
Confirms
correct wiring
and power to
subsystems

Software issue, poor user
calibration

Prevents signal
loss in the air
Establishes
GPS
connection and
established no
interference
w/payload
Correct
calibration for
flight.

Flight computer issue,
software issue, transmitter
issue

Establishes
correct flight
controls for the
RC system

Poor GCS/sensor power,
poor connection with GCS
(software, transmitter), poor
sensor connection, low
bandwidth, too high of data
rate from sensor, lens issue,
poor antenna position.

Confirms good
data flow from
sensor

Sensor jamming, poor
wiring, bad GPS unit,
environmental effect, no
power, faulty flight
computer, GPS masking

Wrong frequency pairing
between transmitter and
receiver.
Gimbal issue, power issue,
GCS issue, wiring issue

Ensure proper
video feed
Confirms
performance of
sensor and
gimbal

Component

Category

Motor

Function check

Propeller

Balancing

GCS

Function check

Battery

Power Check

GCS

Gain Tuning

ESC

Configuration

Multiple

Spares

Checklist Rules
Ensure the correct motor
is commanded from
flight computer. Listen
for odd sounds or
movement.
Ensure each propeller
and backups are
balanced using a
propeller balancer
(standard propellers) or a
scale (foldable
propellers).
Ensure video, battery
data, GPS, and flight
data are displayed on
GCS. Ensure GCS
receives information at
100-yard range.
Ensure batteries are fully
charged, establish cut off
voltage for flight. Test
with voltage monitor or
GCS. 3-3.2 V/cell is
minimum cut of voltage.
Ensure gain tunnning is
correct for selected
configuration or set at
established defaults.
Confirm the correct
configuration for the
ESC for flight profile.
Calibrate ESCs.
Confirm all required
spares are packaged,
configured, and in
working condition.

Possible Failures

Benefits

Motor defect, wiring issue,
failed ESC, wrong ESC
mode, wrong propeller
direction or attachment,
poor motor attachment

Confirms
motors are
functioning
correctly for
stable flight

Manufacturing defect,
damaged propeller

Prevents
unstable flight

Hardware issue, software
issue, transmit issue, power
issue, setting issue

Confirms all
data is
provided to
operator

Software update/reset,
configuration control

Confirms full
endurance
flight
capability
Promotes
stable flight for
selected
payloads

Mode changed by user,
configuration change,
software update

Promotes
stable flight

Batteries not fully charged,
charger issue, wrong battery

Mitigates
component
failures

The largest time commitment checklist is the initial flight checklist, shown in Table 24.
This checklist focusses on performing required functions while the SUAS is airborne in a
controlled manner. The initial flight checklist allows a stable environment for performance issues
to be revealed and mitigated. If possible, the checklist should be performed by the operator with
the aid of the system developer, allowing the operator to gain experience with the handling and
control of SUAS. Tests include a range test, flight control mode, gain tuning, sensor transmit,
takeoff and landing. The initial flight checklist should be performed when any aircraft
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modification is made to the system including new motors, new sensors, shift in center of gravity,
etc. Even if system is in a baseline configuration there should be an established schedule to
perform the checklist based on flight hours. This ensures the SUAS is still performing as
expected and rules out induced errors from the operational environment, transport, or operator
handling. This checklist also includes a possible failure column for operator troubleshooting.

Table 24. Initial Flight Checklists
Component

Multiple

Multiple

Multiple

Multiple

Category

Cyber Vulnerability

Takeoff

Manual Hover

Mode Check

Checklist Rules
Ensure data transmitted
including imagery,
telemetry, and command is
secure. Use close networks
and secured networks if
possible. Implement
failsafes if data has been
compromised.
Slowly spin up motors for
takeoff, listen for any
irregularities. Ensure the air
vehicle is not directly
overhead of anyone. Place
aircraft in hover position
were the operator can
visually see and note
performance of the air
vehicle.
Place the air vehicle into
hover via RC control,
document any drifting,
cyclical, or vibrating
behavior. Document
throttle percentage at hover,
hover should be at 50%
throttle or less.
While in hover place air
vehicle into desired modes
including altitude and
position hold. Document
any drifting, cyclical, or
vibrating behavior. If the
vehicle is making large in
air adjustments, switch to
RC and land immediately.
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Possible Failures

Benefits

Loss of data from
cyber breach put
special operators at
risk.

Prevents data loss
and ensures
mission data is
secure.

Center of gravity,
motors un-leveled,
propeller contact,
excess weight,
depleted battery, motor
failure

Detect poor
performance
before airborne or
on mission.
Ensure safety of
participants and
perform flight
inspection.

Gain tuning
unbalanced in
GCS/flight computer,
environment impacts,
center of gravity issue,
motor/prop issue

Allows stable
position to
evaluate control
issues. Land air
vehicle and make
changes to gains.

Gain tuning
unbalanced in
GCS/flight computer,
environment impacts,
center of gravity issue,
motor/prop issue, GPS
issue

Allows stable
position to
evaluate control
issues. Land air
vehicle and make
changes to gains.

Component

Transmitter/
Receiver

RC

GCS/ Flight
Computer

Sensor

Gimbal

Software

Multiple

Category

Range Check

Responsiveness

Mission Follow

Performance

Performance

Performance

Landing

Checklist Rules
Place air vehicle at desired
operating altitude and move
vehicle away from
transmitter gradually.
Document signal strength
for both RC and GCS.
Control the air vehicle
manually and ensure all
input movement is correct
i.e. yaw input controls, etc.
Operator should perform
desired and required
movement to achieve
comfort with the system and
document any limitations
and alter gain tuning for
desired improvements.
Plan a mission within the
GCS and transmit to air
vehicle, include loiter
points. Document air
vehicle performance and
any deviations from the
mission. Document GPS
performance and
transmitter/receiver
strength.
Confirm sensor
performance while in flight,
ensure data is transferred to
GCS. Check focus levels at
representative altitude, data
bandwidth, and frames per
second.
Operator induces sensor
movement for a desired
target point. Document
performance issues: target
out of view, gimbal lock,
transition time, etc.
Operator sends required
tracking commands or
target detect commands for
the sensor. Operator ensures
the air vehicle follows
commands and provides
feedback to GCS.
Safely land the air vehicle
via RC. Evaluate for any
propeller wash, hard
landing, and stability.

85

Possible Failures

Benefits

On board EMI, body
masking, antenna
issue, environmental
masking, power issue,
software issue

Establishes
approximate
flight range

Gain tuning
unbalanced, excess
weight, low battery,
software issue,
improper wiring,
center of gravity issue

Establishes
correct flight
controls for the
operator

GPS issue,
environment, range,
transmitter/receiver
issue, software issue

Confirms desired
mission
performance

Lens issue,
environment,
transmit/receive issue,
software issue, GCS
issue

Confirms sensor
performance is
appropriate for
mission

Servo issue,
transmit/receive issue,
flight computer issue,
software issue, BEC
issue, environment

Confirms gimbal
performance is
appropriate for
mission

GCS configuration,
software update,
hardware issue, sensor
issue, lens issue,
environment
Propeller wash, high
weight, configuration
issue, center of gravity

Ensures software
and human
interface is
functioning for
mission
Confirms air
vehicle can
handle load and
land safely

Component

Multiple

Category

Checklist Rules
Document time required to
unpack, assemble, and
deploy air vehicle. Then
document time to store
vehicle for transit.

Configuration

Possible Failures
Broken components,
missing parts, missing
tools, frame stiffness
issue

Benefits
Representative
time for mission
deployment
established

The final checklist is a spare checklist. This checklist details the required spare
components for the operator to pack to mitigate critical component failures. Spares should be
pre-configured for ease of integration into the system. For example, the spare flight computer has
the same gain tuning parameters as the onboard flight computer, motors have burn-in test
complete with representative propellers, transmitters and receivers are paired, etc. The spare list
is focused on replacement parts for components which induce category I events if they fail.
Spares should always be packed with the system if room and weight exist in the pack. The spare
checklist is shown in Table 25.

Table 25. Spares Checklist
Component
Propeller
Motor
Flight Computer
GPS
ESC
BEC
Landing Gear Replacement
Kit
Transmitter/ Receiver
Arm Replacement Kit

Number of Spares
1 for each motor

Notes
if quad 4, if hex 6
Burn in completed and preconfigured for assembly.
Correct connections.

1 min, 2 desired
1 fully configured

Correct flight parameters and required cabling

1

Complete with wiring harness

2

Correctly configured, initial inspection completed

design dependent, min 1
1 desired

Correct step-down voltage, complete with wiring
Replacement material, connectors, and fasteners.

1 pair for RC, 1 pair for
GCS, 1 for video
1 desired

Correct frequency and antennas with cabling
Replacement material, connectors, and fasteners.
Fully configured for air vehicle integration and
GCS integration. Does not have to be same as
primary sensor.

1
Backup sensor
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Component
Battery Main

Number of Spares
1 min

Notes
Fully charged

Battery GCS

1 min

Fully Charged

Battery Connectors

1 min

Correct connector type

Battery Payload

1 min

Fully charged
Required tools for tightening fasteners and
assembling components, knife, wire strippers, vice
grips, scissors

Complete set
Tools
kit

Others

Velcro, tape, super glue, fasteners, zip ties

System Design
Define Physical Architecture

Figure 23. Physical Architecture Process

The second section of the product development process is to define the physical
architecture of the systems. It is important to take and balance inputs from the previous steps

87

focusing on initial design criteria, requirements, and mitigating reliability risks to the overall
system. A designcChecklist was built from the author’s experience in the AFIT SUAS design
sequence and online drone design forums. References for the online drone design forums are
listed in Appendix B. These sources were utilized for not only design rules but the ISR SUAS
design itself.
The design checklist provides a ruleset with benefits, as physical architectures are built.
The checklist starts at the system level providing input on multirotor type, material selection,
frame size and then moves to rules for integrating components. Then integration of the
appropriate motor and propeller combination based on frame type and weight is discussed.
Design rules are established for motor size, weight, efficiency, power, torque, and KV value.
Next, electronic components are discussed with and the importance of balancing a power budget
for the SUAS. The power budget impacts battery selection including parameters of capacity, cell
count, and discharge rating. With all components selected, weight budget is assimilated for
endurance and packing weight calculations. The checklist is shown in Table 26.

Table 26. Multirotor Design Checklist
Component

Motor

Sensors

Flight
Computer

Category

Number

Type/size

Type

Checklist Rules
If packing requirement and
endurance can be met, design for
redundancy i.e. 6 motors. If not
design for 4 motors.
Consider sensors to perform mission,
record weight, power requirements
and designs impacts. Investigate the
required components to transmit
signals to the selected GCS interface.
Select flight computers capable of
autonomous and controlled flight.
Investigate how electronic
components interface with the
computer and if the sensor requires
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Benefits

Popular
Brand/ Type

Increases overall
system reliability and
carry weight.
Meet sensor
requirements, focus
on trades for
endurance,
modularity, user
interface, and power.

T-motor,
Multistar,
KDE, Arris

Defines interfaces
and helps establish
wiring diagrams.
Establishes power

Pixhawk:
1,2,4 (open
source),
Piccolo

FLIR, GoPro, Sony,
Runcam
(FPV),
Foxeer (FPV)

Component

Frame

Frame

Category

Type/size

Material

Propeller

Size

Propeller

Material

Propeller

Motor

Motor

Motor

Configuration

Sizing

Weight

Efficiency

Checklist Rules
an interface. The flight computer
should be centered in the frame
design since it is the control hub.

Choose an air frame which supports
the number of motors selected and
packing requirement. Frame must
carry all required components and
weight.
Select frame which has a high
stiffness with capability to be
packaged based on mission
requirements.
Determine propeller diameter based
on frame size, ensure room on frame
for payload. Maximize propeller size
if possible. Consider thrust, motor
efficiency, and heating.
Determine propeller material type
and design which yields best
performance for design. Material
choices are carbon fiber or plastic.
Consider folding propellers and
quick disconnect propellers, evaluate
performance differences between
traditional propellers.
Determine motor size based on
propeller size, consider the most
important design factor for mission:
Weight, Efficiency, Power, or
Torque. These trades balance
payload weight and endurance.
Evaluate thrust test of motor with
correct propeller size and reputation
of motor brand. Seek out motor
testing data with candidate
propellers.
Lighter motors have a better
response to input but are generally
less reliable. Heavier motors pair
well with larger propellers but have a
slower response rate.
Choose a motor that is most efficient
through the range of operations.
Efficiency is measured in
grams/Watt. Brushless motors are
85-90% efficient while brush motors
are 75-80% efficient.
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Benefits
budget and control
nodes.

Frame must fit the
number of motors
and projected design
weight.
Higher stiffness
mitigates control
failure in flight.
Material needs to
fold multiple times
for packing.
Mitigates propeller
and component
failure from strikes.
Design and material
choice paired with
motor type can yield
increased efficiency.

Popular
Brand/ Type
(closed
Source),

Tarot,
Foxtech,
Matrix

Carbon Fiber,
Aluminum
KDE, TMotor, Tiger,
Foxtech

Increases packaging
and decrease user set
up time.

Maximize endurance
for a given design,
select a reliable
brand.
Balance between
weight trades for
endurance and
maximizing propeller
size and thrust
ratings.

Maximize endurance,
determine battery
size required.

T-motor,
Multistar,
KDE, Arris

Component

Category

Motor

Power

Motor

Motor

Torque

KV

ESC

Sizing/type

BEC

Sizing/type

Checklist Rules
Ensure a power to weight ratio of
minimum 2:1 with a goal of 3:1 for
maximizing endurance. Weight is
total weight of air vehicle with
payload and batteries. Power is the
max thrust of all motors with
propellers.
Higher torque allows for quicker
changes in speed and easier user
tuning.
Pick appropriate KV motors for
propeller size. Lower KV motors
pair with larger propellers and higher
KV motors pair with smaller
propellers. Ensure propeller size is
not at the edge of motor design
space.
Once motors are selected pick ESCs
which can handle amp draw for
motors. Always step up a size in
ESCs, if motors are drawing 25A
choose 30A. Frame and design
considerations can dictate 4-in-1
ESC or ESCs for each motor. Ensure
peak current, cell size, programming,
and weight of ESC meet design.
Evaluate ESCs on brand reputation.
Flight computer, sensors, and other
electronics which require voltages
differing from that of the battery will
require BECs. Multiple components
can run off the same BEC if they
have similar voltage ranges.
Evaluate BECs on the voltage range
and brand reputation.

Wiring

Gage Check
and
Connectors

Video
Transmitter/
Receiver

Range/quality/
type

Ensuring wiring and battery
connectors are proper size for
current demands.
Ensure video transmitter choice
interfaces with GCS, meets range
and quality demands. Ensure
onboard transmitter fits within
weight budget.

Signal Budget

Ensure the signals for RC, GCS, and
video are at different frequencies so
all systems function properly

Transmitters/
Receiver
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Benefits
Ensures correct
power draw for
battery and ESC
design. Ensures
hover around 50%
throttle position to
meet endurance.
Torque is a low
design consideration
since the air vehicle
is not acrobatic.

Popular
Brand/ Type

Promotes better
motor propeller
efficiency, benefiting
endurance and
payload weight.

ESCs are critical to
preventing motor
failure. Design
margin should be
built into ESCs for
flight reliability.
BECs are critical for
components that
require voltage levels
different than the
battery (most likely
5V). If the BEC fails
so does the
component.

Ensures reliable
power distribution

Ensures video system
meets requirements
Prevents conflicting
signals and all
systems transmit

Castle Talon,
KDE

Deans
connectors
for low
current, XT
family for
medium to
high
TBS Ground
Station,
Insight SE
Futaba (RC),
Frsky (RC),
Turnigy
(RC), 3DR
(telem)

Component

Category

Multiple

Power Budget

Battery

Size/Number/
Cell count

Multiple

Weight Budget

Checklist Rules
Document power demand for
electronic components and evaluate
against proposed battery
design/choices.
Select batteries which can meet
power demands, and endurance
requirements. Select mah, cell count,
and number of batteries.
Add all components weight and
determine if selected frame is
appropriate. Determine projected
endurance and evaluate against
requirements.

Benefits

Popular
Brand/ Type

Establishes battery
options and
theoretical range
Establishes system
weight and aids in
endurance
calculations

Multistar

Established
endurance envelope,
and packing weight

The top level of the physical architecture is defined by a block diagram shown in Figure
24. The block diagram displays systems, components, and sub components. The architecture
shows there are two modes of control, one through the GCS and the other through a RC
controller. The next level of detail is displayed though an internal block diagram, that reveals
both the physical, data, and power connections between components. The system is broken down
into three sub-systems. Flight control is responsible for performing controlled flight of the
SUAS. Payload system is responsible for the functionality of the on-board sensor. The GCS is
responsible for sending command signals from the operator to the SUAS and receiving
information from both the flight control and payload subsystems. The internal block diagram is
shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 24. SUAS Physical Architecture

Figure 25. SUAS Internal Block Diagram
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The physical architecture diagrams aid in developing design trades within the system.
Design trades can be architectural, configuration, or component based. Architectural trades
change the overall design of the SUAS system. An example would be implementing six motors
versus four motors, driving a change of frame for a quad rotor to hexa rotor. Architecture trades
allocate changes to the entire system. In the case of moving from a quad to hexa rotor changes
the entire componentry of the system due to a larger frame. It also changes the layout of where
components are placed and configured on the SUAS. Due to this trickle-down effect architectural
trades must be considered first in the design process.
Configuration trades affect the number of components and/or the placement of
components. An example of this is implementing a secondary battery designated for the payload
system. This trade affects the wiring and powering configuration of the entire system. It also
dictates if additional components are required for implementation, for example structural
platforms, BEC, and PDUs. Since configuration trades change the layout, connections, and
components within the SUAS, they must be considered second.
Finally, there are component trades. Within component trades there are two levels, simple
trades and complex trade. Simple trades are component swaps without impacts on the systems
architecture and limited impact on configuration. Changing to a more reliable motor with a
similar KV rating would be an example of this, since the new motor can be integrated without
impacts to the rest of the architecture and configuration. Complex component trades drive
changes to the system architecture or have a major impact on configuration. In the case of the
ISR mission, complex component trades involve selection of a sensor and the ability to transmit
the sensor data. An example of this is changing from an analog video transmission system to a
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digital system. Digital transmission requires a change of transmitter and receiver pair, hardware
and software video interface with GCS, camera and wiring changes.
Each design trade has a cost and benefit to the system. Cost and benefits are scoped and
evaluated against system requirements. By balancing these trades against prioritized
requirements, informed design decisions can be made for the benefit of the system. An analysis
of example design trades against the established ISR mission is detailed in Table 27. Example
components for commercial SUAS are listed within table for reference.
Table 27. SUAS Design Trade Space
Trade

Benefits

6 Motors

Motor redundancy, system
can accept 1-2 motor loss,
larger lift, bigger payload

Frame PDU
Sensor Gimbal
Payload Battery
BEC Power
Regulator,
opposed to ESC

4 in one ESC

Less parts/space/weight
Range of video, decreased
control burden on air
vehicle, stable video

Type

Endurance, size,
weight
Soldering, more
wiring, exposed to
elements
Complexity, weight,
size, space,
endurance

Tarot 680 (hex) vs.
Tarot 650 (quad)

Architecture

Tarot 650 Sport

Architecture

Weight, space, setup time

Higher power reliability,
less heating

Higher part count,
weight, space
Cooling, hard to
replace component if
it fails, single point
of failure, poor
reliability for high
energy

Less parts, less wiring,
combines PDU and ESC,
protected from crash

GCS
Tablet/phone
GCS Open
Source

User editability, rapid
updates, security

GCS Laptop

Example

Endurance, Closed payload
system for troubleshooting

Less wiring, dedicated
wiring hub
Better troubleshooting,
robust user control,
processing power
Simplified interface,
lightweight, space,
portability

Dedicated PDU

Costs

Yuneec Cgo3 4k
Configuration
6S 10000 mah
primary battery, 3S
850 mah payload

Configuration

CASTLECSE010000400

Configuration

Soldering can be
failure point

AIKON AK32 35A
BLHELI_32
REALACC Matek
Mini Power
Distribution Board

Configuration

Weight, space, setup time

Panasonic
Toughbook

Configuration

iPad mini

Configuration

QGroundControl

Configuration

Troubleshooting,
user options
Requires in depth
knowledge of
software
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Configuration

Trade

Benefits

GCS Closed
Source

Stable baseline, simple
interface

Retractable
Landing Gear

Increase video field of view

Plastic Propellers

Dampening vibrations due
to material flex

Carbon Fiber

Rigid to prevent flex,
durability
Storage size, store system
with propellers mounted
(reduce setup time), leading
and lagging creates
balancing effect, noise

Costs
Limited to make
changes, restricts
component use, DoD
security concerns
Weight, complexity
Efficiency loss due
to material flex,
durability
Require balancing,
prone to cracking
from crash

Example

Type

Configuration
Tarot 650 Sport
servo retractable
landing gear
Aerostar Composite
Propeller 15x5.5
Grey (CW/CCW)

Simple
Component

KDE-CF155-DP

Simple
Component

KDE-CF155-DP

Simple
Component

Dynam 15x5.5
Carbon Fiber
Propellers for
Multirotor (CW and
CCW)

Simple
Component

Simple
Component

Traditional
Propellers

Data availability, proven
designs

Sensitive to fastener
tension to mitigate
flex, manufacturing
to balance is difficult
Misbalancing of
propeller in
horizontal position,
excess vibration,
increase motor
stress, storage

Triple Blade
Propellers

Increased thrust for smaller
propeller size

Endurance,
efficiency

KDE-CF155-TP

Simple
Component

FPV sensor

Weight, size, live video

Range, video quality

Runcam Eagle 2

Complex
Component

Folding
Propellers

HD sensor
Analog Video
Transmission
Digital Video
Transmission

Video quality, video
storage
Light components, low
latency. Simple design will
not freeze.

Higher image quality

Latency, weight,
size, possible RF
interference, power
Poor video quality,
low frame rate, no
encryption
Image processing/
compression,
latency, few out of
box solutions
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FLIR Duo, GoPro
TBS Ground
Station, 2.4 Ghz,
Yagi antenna

Amimon
Connex LR

Complex
Component
Complex
Component
Complex
Component

Frame Selection

Figure 26. Component Selection Process
Designing the system is performed by progressing through the design trade space,
evaluating decisions against the design checklist, and evaluating component selections against
requirements. The first trade space area to evaluate is architectural decisions, based on frame
selection. The frame affects the following requirements: endurance, transport, set up time, and
number of operators required for set up. Following the design trade space, Table 27, the first
trade is the number of motors. Research revealed current commercially available hexarotors are
unable to meet the transport and endurance requirements established in Table 2. In turn, the
design must be based on a quadrotor architecture. Commercially available quadrotor
architectures were investigated. The candidate quadrotor architectures are presented in Table 28.
These candidate architectures show either recommended componentry or proven builds by the
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manufacture, providing realistic endurance values. Frames were discriminated based on
component integration space, endurance, and ease of transport.
Name

Foxtech Hover 1

Foxtech F1000 Pro

Tarot Peeper

Tarot 650

Take-Off
Weight

1400 g (battery
excluded, as
configured)

1900g

1565 g

476g, 1700g
(total)

Carbon Fiber
hub, aluminum
arms

Carbon Fiber

Frame
Material

Carbon Fiber

Carbon Fiber

Frame Type

Quad

Folded
Dimensions

285 mm x 285 mm x
175 mm, Foldable
arms

Quad
Detachable Arms
with configured
ESC, Motor, and
propeller dimension
of arm 310 mm.
Quick disconnect.

Unfolded
Dimensions

640 mm x 640 mm x
280 mm

560 mm X 160 mm
(tall)

Foldable arms
to 750 mm, preassembled
motors and esc
440 mm X 210
mm X 258 mm
(tall)

Flight time

55 mins (as
configured)

60 min

45-60 min

T-Motor U8 Pro,
brushless
100

4008 Brushless
Motor TK2955
330

Motors
KV

T-Motor MN3508
380

Quad

Prop

Foxtech 15522
Folding Propeller

Foxtech Supreme
28"

TL 2948 17.5"
Folding Props

ESC

Hobbywing X rotor
40 A

T-motor Flame 60
A

40 A ESC

Landing
Gear

Foldable Aluminum

Carbon Fiber,
detachable

GPS

Pixhawk

DJI A3

Batteries

10000 mah 6s Li-ion

(2) Li-ion 12500
mah

Camera

HD 10 X zoom
FH310Z or W (250g)

Gimbal

3 Axis

GCS

Ipad Mini

Ipad

RC Control/
Receiver

Futaba 14SG Radion
Controller, Taranis
X9D Plus RC

DJI
Lightbridge/Futaba
14 SG

Quad
Foldable
arms to 650
mm and
landing gear.
Air vehcle
folds flat.
650 mm X
650 mm X
170 mm
45 min

2177 g
Carbon fiber
and
aluminum
arms
Quad
Foldable
arms to 780
mm x 295
mm (w) x
110 mm (h)

40-42 min

T-motor
Antigravity
4004
300
T-motor
15x5 Carbon
Fiber
T-motor 25A
2s-6s
Simonk ESC

40 A

Foldable
carbon fiber

Static carbon
fiber

Lipo 10000
mah, 6S

U5 T-Motor

15"

22000 mah
6s battery
Hero 4/ 3
Gimbal or
600TVL
Camera

Multiple,
exchangeable
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Matrix-I

FrSky D8RXP Receiver

Futaba
EZUHF

Name

Foxtech Hover 1

Foxtech F1000 Pro

Flight
Computer

Pixhawk

DJI A3/DJI N3

Tarot 650
3DR
Pixhawk

Matrix-I
Naza V2
Flight
Controller

Too large for
transport,
low
endurance

Low
endurance

Rain Proof

Environment

Feasibility

Tarot Peeper

Possible design
requires control
redundancy. Room
for components.

Too large/heavy to
transport

Possible design,
large folded
dimension, low
clearance for
gimbal
integration

Table 28. Quadrotor Frame Options
The frame selected was Foxtech Hover 1with a configured endurance of 55 minutes,
room for additional components, small folding dimensions for transport. It was the only frame to
meet the discrimination criteria. Table 29 shows more detailed specifications of the frame. The
selected frame provides a take-off weight as configured, this weight includes 4 motors, 4 ESCs, 4
propellers, frame, landing gear, and wiring. This configuration provides a baseline for more
reliable component swaps as progress is made in the design. Additionally, the frame selected
does not include an integrated PDU. Exposure to weather elements and transport risk preclude
PDU integration for the ISR mission.
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Table 29. Quadrotor Frame Options (Foxtech, 2018; glassfox, 2017)
Name

Foxtech Hover 1

Take-Off Weight

1400 g (battery excluded, as
configured)

All Up Weight

2300 g

Frame Material
Frame Type
Frame Weight

Carbon Fiber
Quad
596 g

Folded Dimensions

11.22 in x 11.22 in x 6.89 in,
Foldable arms

Unfolded
Dimensions
Flight time
Motors
Motor Weight
KV

25.20 in x 25.20 in x 11.02 in
55 mins (as configured)
T-Motor MN3508
82 g
380

Prop

Foxtech 15522 Folding
Propeller

ESC
Landing Gear
Battery
Battery Weight
Camera
Camera System
Weight

Hobbywing X rotor 40 A
Foldable Aluminum
6S3P Lithium Ion 9500 mah
900 g
FH310 Z 1080P w/3 axis
gimbal
368 g
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Figure 27. Foxtech Hover 1 Folded Dimensions (Foxtech, 2018)
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Figure 28. Foxtech Hover 1 Unfolded Dimensions (Foxtech, 2018)

Evaluating the frame against the design check list for type/size category reveals the frame
can support required components and meets the packaging requirement of fitting in a ruck sack
of 22" X 14" X 9". It currently contributes 1.4 kg to the allocated 5 kg system weight. The
material category for the frame is carbon fiber with aluminum legs which supports a high level of
frame stiffness supporting controlled flight. Setup time for the frame, as configured, is 150
seconds by one operator; this includes deploying four arms, four landing gear, connecting a GPS,
connecting a battery, and connecting a camera system (N, 2016). This setup time is within the 5minute requirement objective and promotes operator design criteria of simplicity and prevention
of betrayal. Landing gear are static which increases system reliability by eliminating a landing
gear retraction servo. The landing gear are relatively small and are acceptable being within the
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proposed cameras field of view. Integration of a gimbal will be investigated to mitigate the
impact of the landing gear on imagery.
Motor Selection
The next design point considered is motor selection. The Foxtech Hover 1 base
configuration uses T-Motor MN3508 at 380 KV paired with 15” folding propellers. T-motors are
a trusted brand and a quality motor selection, per online sources. Per T-motors website a 15”
propeller at 50% on a 6 cell (6S) battery has power demand of 80 W, thrust of 820 g, and an
efficiency of 10.26 g/W. With a thrust of 820 g/motor the total lift capability of the air vehicle is
3.28 kg at 50% throttle. All up-base configuration weight is 2.3 kg, therefore a 50 % hover is
achievable. The power to weight ratio must be checked for the max thrust of the motors. At
100% throttle four motors produce 7.52 kg of thrust, dividing by air vehicle all up weight gives a
ratio of 3.27. This meets the goal design checklist criteria of a power to weight ratio of 3. In fact,
there is trade space with this value. A smaller 14” propeller could be used leveraging a higher
efficiency albeit at the cost of thrust. With a 14” propeller 2.84 kg of thrust is produced at 50%,
and the max thrust produced is 6.92 kg. Dividing this thrust by air vehicle all up weight gives a
thrust to weight ratio of 3. If slightly more thrust and efficiency are required out of motor in
order to handle additional weight or endurance, the T-Motor Antigravity 4006-380 are a design
option. Paired with a 15” propeller the motor produces 805 g of thrust at 74.4 W with a 10.82
efficiency. Max thrust produced is 8.9 kg, giving a power to weight ratio of 3.87. Both motor’s
recommend motor or bearing change after 60 flight hours (T-Motor, 2017, 2018a).
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Figure 29. T-Motor MN3508 380 KV (T-Motor, 2018b)

Figure 30. T-Motor Antigravity 4006 KV380 (T-Motor, 2018a)
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ESC Selection
With the motors selected, ESCs are selected and sized. The ESC design trade is either an
ESC for each motor or a 4-in-one ESC. For the selected ISR mission single ESCs promote the
operator’s design criteria of simplicity. As previously stated, the number of parts the operator
must interact with to operate or repair the system should be low and intuitive. Time is the
operator’s most valuable resource. While an ESC for every motor is four more parts than a 4-inone ESC, the repair and troubleshooting are less time consuming. If a 4-in-one ESC fails all
motors fails. In a 4-in-one ESC failure, the fault is not isolated, therefore the operator is unable to
discern the cause of the failure. The failure may be the flight computer, battery, wiring, or ESC.
Additionally, the 4-in-one ESC is often located in the center of the air frame for center of gravity
purposes, this makes it more difficult to access, troubleshoot, and repair. Single ESCs are placed
within the frame at the arm junction points, allowing for user accessibility. A quick inspection on
a single ESC will reveal if a failure has occurred, as black burnt electronics will be visible.
Design recommendations from AFIT’s ANT Lab staff is to use ESCs for each motor for all
multirotor designs. Their experience has revealed single ESCs are more reliable in handling
current demands for multirotors greater than 1 kg.
Sizing for ESCs are based on current rating. Current rating is set at two levels, continuous
and burst. The current the ESC will experience is based on the maximum current the motor will
experience. These values can be determined by motor specification provided by the supplier. If
the data is not provided by the supplier, the max current for the motor is determined by dividing
the motor rated watts by battery voltage. For the ISR mission the SUAS is most likely using 6S
or 4S lithium polymer or lithium ion batteries to achieve the required flight endurance. The S
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rating of the battery is the number of cells, each cell carries 3.7 volts. Therefore, a 6S battery
carries a voltage of 22.2 V and a 4S 14.8 V.
For the two motor solutions selected the maximum amperage is provided by the suppler.
Suppliers often test maximum amperage at motor efficiencies less than 100%, down to 80%
efficiency. For a conservative design the assumed efficiency of tested by T-motor is 80%, a
factor of 1.25 will be applied to the maximum amperage. MN3508 motor has a list maximum
14A, with a factor of 1.25 this raises to 17.5A (T-Motor, 2018b). The Antigravity 4006-380 has a
maximum of 16A, with a factor of 1.25 this raised to 20A (T-Motor, 2018a). In turn, the design
requires an ESC rated greater than 20A. A 25A Castle Talon ESC handling up to 6S battery is a
good choice. This ESC comes with an 8A BEC for handling any servos required in the build, an
example would be a gimbal. It provides a user manual for install, operation, and ESC mode
programming (Castle Creations, 2013).

Figure 31. Castle Creations Talon 25 AMP ESC, 6S/25V with 8 AMP BEC (Castle Creations,
2018)
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Propeller Selection
The next design decision is the selection of propellers. Sizing for the propeller is based on
frame and motor limitations. The current frame unfolded diameter is 640 mm and can handle up
to a 17” propeller. Both selected motors are specified at 15” with the MN3508 operating at 70°C
and Antigravity 4006-380 46°C. The temperature was recorded on the surface of the motor in
100% throttle for 10 minutes. 70°C is a high operating temperature for brushless motors and
operating at this level increases the probability failure. For a conservative design a 14” propeller
should be paired with the MN3508 motors. The Antigravity motors allow for maximum 16”
propeller but the operating temperature stated is HOT. In turn, the largest propellers safe for
these motors are a 15.5” propellers, with a projected maximum temperature of 63°C.
In the case of the ISR mission, transportability is a critical function. The SUAS system
must fit within the rucksack dimension in order to be transported to the deployment location. To
achieve this the selected platform must be folded and stowed in the operator’s rucksack. To
decrease deployment time folding propellers are preferred. The folding capability allows the
propellers to be transported in an installed configuration on the frame. Folding propellers can
induce frame vibrations and require proper torqueing of attachment points, this is a required
preflight checklist step.
Material is also an important selection step. Current multirotor options are either plastic
or carbon fiber. Carbon fiber frames are more rigid and providing more control and are more
efficient than plastic. Brittleness from ground impacts is mitigated by carrying spares. A trusted
brand of folding propeller is KDE. The KDE-CF155-DP is a 15.5” x 5.3 pitch propeller which
meets the design criteria. The two bladed variant was selected over the three bladed variant since
the design is for a small payload only, resulting in a low thrust requirement. KDE propellers are
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dynamically-balanced matched pairs and must be kept in set, meaning if one blade tip is
damaged the entire propeller pair must be replaced. Selection of the KDE propellers eliminates
the MN3508 possibility from the trade space due to overheating concerns from a large propeller.

Figure 32. KDE-CF155-DP 15.5” x 5.3 Propeller (KDE Direct, 2018)

Flight Computer Selection
With the frame and the propulsion system established, the brain of the SUAS can be
selected. The flight computer controls the functionality of the drone and bounds the user
interfaces. In the ISR mission, the flight computer must handle dual control modes, programable
flight and controlled flight. The main trade in for flight computers is open source software versus
closed source. Top flight computers for open source are the Pixhawk family, and they include
flight computers for various applications that run on the same software. User forums,
documentation, software updates, troubleshooting guides are available to anyone for free at
ardupilot.org.
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The top-flight computers for closed source flight computers are built by DJI.
Functionality of these computers are limited to what is provided in the device and software. DJI
does provide the simplest out of the box solution, since the customer base is the general public
with little to no drone experience. The DJI computers interface most reliably with DJI cameras
and therefore limit design trade space. Recently the DoD has banned DJI drones and components
over security concerns, citing “increased awareness of cyber vulnerabilities associated with DJI
products (Newman, 2017).” Due to these security concerns the Pixhawk was selected as the
flight computer for the ISR mission.
The current proven Pixhawk flight computer is the Pixhawk 2 Cube built by ProfiCNC.
The Pixhawk 2 has a triple redundant isolated inertial measurement unit (IMU) system including
accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, and barometers. It is also designed for operational
conditions with enhanced drop and shock resistance. The Pixhawk 2 interfaces with Mission
Planner or Qgroundcontrol mission planning software and telemetry information is transmitted
either 915MHz or 433Mhz. Mission planning software can be run through a tablet, phone, or
laptop. Included with the Pixhawk 2 is all required connection cabling, XT60 Battery Power
module connector, micro USB cable, frame mounting pad, arming buzzer, and mounting screws.
Figure 33 details the wiring diagram for the Pixhawk 2.
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Figure 33. Wiring Diagram Pixhawk 2 Cube (Hex, 2018)

Select Video Transmission System
The two most common transmission frequencies for video are 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz. 2.4
GHz provides the longest range and best penetrating frequency for video transmission. This
frequency is also the most popular for remote control transmitters therefore, deconfliction
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between the two must occur to achieve reliable vehicle performance. With 2.4GHz being the
main frequency for remote control, 5.8 GHz is the most popular frequency to gather first person
video from the drone. At this frequency video latency is adequate but range and obstacle
interference become a concern. Companies are experimenting with different frequencies; FPV
Blue released a digital video system in 2017 which transmits at 1.2GHz, promoting a range of 7
km with less than 50 ms latency at 720p video (FPV Blue, 2018). This system is still in beta
development but shows future promise in image quality and range for live video systems. In
addition to frequency, antenna types, antenna directionality, and transmitter power can affect the
range of the transmission. For the ISR mission the 5.8GHz is the selected video frequency due to
maturity of the technology and commercial availability.
The next design trade to consider is digital transmission versus analog. Analog
transmission has benefits of direct signal, low latency, and large component market.
Disadvantages to analog include low image quality, signal interference, low frame rate, and lack
of encryption. Digital transmission provides high image quality at the cost of latency due to
signal conversion. While A low latency rate is important for racing drones due to rapid position
and speed changes, it is deemphasized in favor of image quality in aerial photography drones.
The ISR mission requirements align closely with aerial photography, therefore a digital system is
preferred over analog.
A current out of the box digital transmission solution at the 5.8 GHz frequency for over
1-mile range is the Amimon Connex LR Receiver paired with the Connex Mini Transmitter. The
system offers a directional range up to 3 km or 1.8 miles with HDMI out video. Video formats
range from 1080p to 576p at less than 1 msec latency. The receiver system is easily backpack
portable at 660 grams and dimensions of 7.9 in X 7.9 in X 2 in. Power for the receiver is
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provided by a 3S-6S lithium polymer battery through a provided XT90 or XT60 connector. For
maximum range a tripod is required for the receiver where the main lobe of the system’s five
antennas spread 70° horizontally and 25° vertically. It is important to position the flight of the
SUAS within this spread to achieve maximum range.
The system provides the following information to be displayed on the GCS: video
strength, distance, video resolution, selected frequency, bandwidth, home location arrow.
Additional telemetry information such as height, yaw, ground speed, flight mode, number of
GPS, and aircraft battery charge may be displayed when the transmitter is connected to flight
computer. The Connex system is compatible with the Pixhawk family of flight computers. Both
the transmitter and receiver can be updated with required firmware provided by Amimcon.
Additional specifications, performance parameters, and installation instruction can be found in
the Connex LR Manual (Amimon, 2018).

111

Figure 34. Amimon Connex LR Receiver and Connex Mini Transmitter (getfpv.com, 2018a,
2018b)

Figure 35. Concept of Operations Connex LR Video Receiver (Amimon, 2018)

Camera System Selection
The first design decision for the camera system is to incorporate a gimbal system. A
gimbal provides user-controlled range independent of the air vehicle enabling stable image
viewing. The selection of a gimbal comes at the cost of weight, power, and complexity, affecting
requirements of endurance, user set time, and number of operators. Gimbals add from 100-300 g
of payload and consume approximately 200-350mA, this can reduce endurance by up to 5
minutes in the established endurance model, Table 33.
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In the transportation of the SUAS, the gimbal is required to be separate for the air
vehicle, due to rucksack space limitation. This attachment process for the gimbal, prior to launch,
can add 1-2 minutes of operator install time. The addition of the gimbal can also complicate the
control structure of the SUAS in flight; if the flight is being controlled by remote control, gimbal
operation may require a second operator due to task saturation. For an ISR mission to be
successful some sort of intelligence must be gained by the operational user, a gimbal stabilizes
the data provided by a camera maximizing the quality of the intelligence. The cost to the systems
requirements from a gimbal is within the acceptable trade space, therefore a gimbal is
recommended for better ISR capability.
The second design decision is to incorporate a HD camera or a First-Person View (FPV)
camera. Since the selected video transmitter is digital and HD capability a HD camera is selected
for the design, promoting better image quality. The recommended camera system for the Foxtech
Hover 1 frame is the FH310Z 1080p HD 10X Optical Zoom Camera with 3-Axis control. The
gimbal system is designed to match the Hover 1 frame and mounts easily on the lower platform.
The camera can display live day time video up 1080p, when paired with the Connex system.
Additionally, the camera can record video while in flight through a 32 GB SD card slot. Camera
functionality of zoom, move, and mode control can be integrated into the flight control
transmitter for operator remote control. Mode controls include photo shoot, video recording
start/stop, and live feed selections. The system demands static current of 240mA at 12V or
320mA at 12V. All up-system weight is 370g with the camera weight 110g and the gimbal
weighing 260g. Figure 36 shows the FH310Z camera with gimbal system and Figure 37 shows
the camera system mounted on the Hover 1 platform.
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Figure 36. FH310Z Camera with Gimbal System (Foxtech, 2017)

Figure 37. FH310Z Camera with Gimbal System Mounted on Foxtech Hover 1 Platform
(Foxtech, 2017)
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Power System Selection
Trades for the power system include battery chemistry type, cell count, and inclusion of a
payload battery. Proven battery chemical technology for SUAS include lithium polymer or
lithium ion. Lithium polymer batteries have become popular due to high C rating or discharge
capability. Lithium polymer batteries with medium capacity, 8,000 mah to 10,000 mah, have a C
rating ranging from 10 to 30 C, while similar lithium ion batteries possess C ratings of 3C to 5C.
The C rating on the battery determines how much amperage can be safely drawn by the motors.
This max safe current draw per motor is determined by multiplying the rated battery capacity by
the C rating and dividing by the number of motors. This value is then compared to the motors
current draw at 100% throttle for design viability.
The selected Antigravity motors provide data for a 16” propeller with the maximum
current draw at 100% throttle of 17.5A (T-Motor, 2018a). With four motors, the required current
for the propulsion system is 70A. A lithium ion battery with a 9,000 mah capacity and 5C rating
can provide a total of 45A. Since this value is less than the required 70A, lithium ion batteries are
not a viable design. Conversely, a 9,000 mah lithium polymer battery with a 10C rating provides
90A meeting the design requirements. Therefore, a lithium polymer battery is selected for the
ISR mission.
Cell count is described in series and parallel for batteries. Cells in series add 3.7 volts for
each cell to the overall battery voltage. For example, a 6S or 6 series cell has a voltage of 22.2
and a 4S has a voltage 14.8. Higher battery voltage allows for lower current draw, less voltage
sag, and higher response in motors. These performance improvements come at the cost of added
battery weight, which may reduce endurance. For mission reliability purposes the lower current
draw keeps the battery cooler battery during flight, promoting maximum life for the battery.
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From a user control perspective 6S batteries enable a more responsive multirotor due to lower
voltage sag under load, enabling the motors to change RPM more rapidly (Liang, 2018). For the
ISR mission responsiveness is important to prevent enemy detecting and for taking evasive
maneuvers to ditch the air vehicle. For these reasons a 6S battery is desired.
The final design point for the power system is for a payload battery. Payload batteries
allow the operator to independently test and troubleshoot the payload system prior to flight
without effecting endurance time. Of course, an added payload battery adds weight for both the
air vehicle and the operator to transport to the deployment location.
In flight, the payload battery does add another failure point to the system, if the payload
battery fails the functionality of surveillance is not upheld. Although the criticality of this failure
is reduced, in most cases, from a category I to a category III. The operator will be able to recover
the aircraft, isolate the fault to the payload system, and replace the defective component with a
spare within a short period of time. Conversely, if the system only contained a primary battery
and this component failed the air vehicle will no longer perform the function of flight, and the
mission would terminate. These risk mitigations for both preflight and in-flight show that use of
a payload battery is warranted if the threshold requirement value of endurance can be meet.
From the above discussion the system will include two batteries, primary for flight and
secondary for payload. The primary battery will be a 6S lithium polymer. Current ratings for the
battery selected is based on endurance calculation aimed at achieving the threshold requirement
at 45 minutes of flight with the associated all up weight for the air vehicle. A current trusted
brand for multirotors recommend by the ANT Lab staff and online drone blogs is Multistar
batteries. This brand experiences low level of failures in flight and provides nominal flight
performance. A Multistar High Capacity 10000mAh 6S 10C Multi-Rotor Lipo Pack XT90 at a
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weight of 1189g provides a projected flight time of 48 minutes per endurance calculations
performed in Table 33.

Figure 38. 10000mAh 6S 10C Multi-Rotor Lipo Pack XT90 (Amazon, 2018)

Flight Remote Controller Selection
The transmitter of the remote controller is what the operator uses to send commanded
input to the air vehicle. The receiver on board the air vehicle receives the commands from the
operator and sends the commands to the flight computer to perform the actions. Important
aspects to consider for the remote controller pair is range, ease of use, functionality, and
durability.
A leading brand for flight controllers and revivers is Futaba. Remote control forums and
user reviews place trust in Futaba for reliability, range, and build quality. The Futaba T14SG is
considered on one of the most reliable transmitters on the market (“Which Is The Best
Quadcopter Transmitter?,” 2018). It includes 14 channel control or 14 functions commands
which can be sent to the aircraft. This is useful for the operator to control the flight of the air
vehicle and to control the camera system when the flight of the air vehicle is being controlled by
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the autopilot. User reviews and groups describe the maximum range of the 2.4Ghz transmitter at
4.5 km or 2.8 miles. This range is evaluated at a clear line of sight and is reduced to under a mile
with obstacle interference. The Futaba T14SG transmitter can contain up to 30 models, meaning
30 different SUAS or configurations can be flown with the same transmitter. The transmitter also
has the ability to receive telemetry, battery, and link data to a 1.75 X 3 in backlit LCD screen,
providing critical information to the operator. Another benefit of this transmitter is that it can be
paired with any Futaba 2.4Ghz receiver, further increasing the systems modularity (Futaba,
2018). With any remote-control system, it is important for the operator to train and become
familiar with the controller’s function and feel, to mitigate any potential user induced error into
the system.

Figure 39. Futaba T14SG transmitter (Futaba, 2018)
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GCS Selection
With the selected flight computer as a Pixhawk 2, the GCS software is bounded to open
source options. Popular software includes Mission Planner, APM Planner 2, MAV Proxy,
QGroundControl, and UgCS. The only software which is compatible with all platforms to
include Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, Andriod and iOS is QGroundControl (ArduPilot Dev
Team, 2016). This maximizes platform flexibility and minimizes the amount of software
operational users must be familiar with. Key interface features of QGroundControl are mission
planning for autonomous flight, flight map display of vehicle and tracking information, video
streaming with instrument displays, and support for multiple vehicles. Software downloads and
complete user guide is available online at https://docs.qgroundcontrol.com/en/.
The next step for the GCS for the ISR mission is selecting the appropriate hardware.
Options for hardware are laptop, tablet, phone, or a combination of devices. To meet the mission
planning time objective of 10 minutes a laptop is preferred. The laptop configuration allows the
operator to plan and view routes on a larger screen, input commands with a touchpad and
keyboard, and access more features of the software. Once the air vehicle is set up and routes are
planned, a phone configuration is desired for mission viewing and any route deviation. A phone
can be mounted on the flight transmitter, enabling the operator to view mission progress and
video feed through the phone while controlling the air vehicle. A two GCS system allows one
operator to focus on flight and another operator to focus on surveillance, mitigating risk for each
function. Since two operators for operations is a threshold requirement, this is an acceptable
trade. A Panasonic Toughbook is an excellent option for handling a rugged deployed
environment for a primary GCS handling drops, humidity, high temperature, and vibrations.
Packing weight for the Toughbook is 4.2 lbs at 10.7” x 13.6” x 1.2”.
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Figure 40. QGroundControl User Interface (“QGroundControl User Guide,” 2018)
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Budget Allocation

Figure 41. Budget Allocation Process

Once all components are selected for the ISR mission the budgets for frequency, weight,
and power must be allocated. The frequency budget ensures the telemetry, command and control,
and video signals are within their own band, preventing harmful system interactions. Table 30
shows the signal frequency for the selected components. All systems are in separate frequency
bands and the system is projected to perform nominally.
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Table 30. Frequency Budget
System
Flight Telemetry
Video Transmitter

Component
3DR Telemetry Radio
Transmitter/ Receiver
Connex LR System

Frequency
915MHz or
433Mhz
5.8GHz

Remote Control
Transmitter

Futaba 14SG Transmitter
and Receiver

2.4GHz
Frequency
Hopping

The next budget to perform is the weight allocation for both the air vehicle and additional
components. The weight of the air vehicle is important since the threshold requirement is 5 kg
and is also a critical piece of information for endurance calculations. The additional components
weight, used for ground support, provide the total system weight. Components not previously
mentioned for the air vehicle include HERE+ GPS, Pixhawk 2 Power Module (5V), 850mAh 3S
lithium polymer payload battery, and additional wiring. Combined with the previous air vehicle
components this provides an all up weight of approximate 3 kg. Components not previously
mentioned for the additional components include a tripod transmitter mounting and 5200mAh 4S
lithium polymer for transmitter power. Additional component weight is approximately 5.2 kg
bringing the complete system weight to 8.3 kg. Table 31 details the componentry weight for the
ISR SUAS. Included in the table is the system cost and air vehicle cost, where air vehicle cost
include all components except GCS, RC transmitter, Video receiver, and tripod.
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Table 31. Weight Budget with Cost

Component
Hover 1 Frame
4X Antigravity MN4006 Motors w/wiring
4X KDE-CF155-DP 15.5" Folding Propellers
4X KDE-DPA-ML Propeller Adapters
4X Castle Talon 25 AMP ESC w/wiring
Pixhawk 2 Cube
Pixhawk 2 Power Module
Here GPS
Connex LR Video Receiver
Connex Mini Transmitter
Telemetry Transmitter/ Receiver

Pack
Air Vehicle
Weight
Weight (g)
(g)
596
272
58.8
56
71.6
39
24
49
660
60
15

Camera

15
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Gimbal
850mAh 3S Lipo Payload
10A 6S Lipo
Other Wiring
Tripod
5.2 A 4S Lipo
Futaba R7008SB Receiver
Futaba 14SG Transmitter
Panasonic Toughbook
Sum
Air Vehicle Only Cost (less GCS, RC
Transmitter, and Video Receiver)

260
83
1189
100
1180
430
10.9

2992.3

980
1905
5170

Cost ($)
1400
300
156
80
180
250
Incl
w/Comp
95
1750
650
25
Incl
w/Frame
Incl
w/Frame
10
120
25
100
50
165
650
1450
$7,456
$3,456

The last budget is performed on the power system. The power system is divided into two
sections depending on their power source. The budget evaluates all components that demand
power, less the motors. The control section, powered by the main battery, powers the Pixhawk 2,
Futaba receiver, and telemetry receiver. The video section, powered by the payload battery,
includes the gimbal, camera, and Connex Mini transmitter. Power draw values obtained from the
product specifications are provided in Table 32, along with required power levels. The control
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system power level is managed by a 5V Pixhawk 2 power module and the video system is
managed by direct voltage from the 3S payload battery at 11.1V.

Table 32. Power Budget
Component

Power Draw
(mA)

Pixhawk 2
Connex Mini Transmitter
Gimbal + Camera

280
400
280

Futaba Receiver
Telemetry Transmitter
Sum Control
Sum Video
Sum

75
25
380
680
1060
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Power
(V)
4.8 to
5.4
8 to 26
11 to 12
3.7 to
7.4
3.7 to 6

Hover Endurance Calculation

Figure 42. System Reliability and Requirement Analysis
With the power demand and all up weight determined for the air vehicle the hover
endurance can be calculated. Using the propeller momentum theory, the theoretical time in hover
can be calculated for the system (Phillips, 2004). The power required per propeller ideal is
calculated using Equation 2. The propeller efficiency is set at 90% and air density is calculated at
sea level and 20 °C.
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The ideal power per propeller fails to incorporate inefficiencies in electric motors, to account for
this Equation 3 is used. For a brushless motor 85% efficiency is standard. The current per motor
is calculated using Equation 4 based on the volts per cell, number of cells, and efficiency of the
battery. The total current of the system is calculated by the current per motor multiplied by
number of motors plus additional current required for the system, this is shown in Equation 5.
The ISR SUAS has four motors and has an additional current requirement on the main battery of
0.38A for control systems, seen in Table 32.
Finally, the time in hover is calculated by accounting for the battery capacity, percent
usable battery capacity and the efficiency of the battery. For the developed SUAS, the battery
capacity is 10000 mah, a usable percentage of 85%, and an efficiency of 90%. Equation 6 shows
this calculation. Table 33 shows the parameters and calculated information for the ISR SUAS
hover time. The table shows a projected hover time of 48 minutes. This is a theoretical value and
requires real world testing to determine the operational endurance incorporating factors such as
humidity, temperature, wind, transitional lift, and system losses.
,

(2)

,
∗
∗

∗

∗ 60

,
,

#

(3)

#

(4)
,

%

,
(5)

126

Table 33. Endurance Calculations
mass w/o primary battery and
motors[kg]
gravity[m/sec^2]
air density[kg/m^3]
prop diameter[in]
prop diameter[m]
prop efficiency
motor efficiency
number battery cells
rated battery capacity [Ah]
battery voltage[volts]
battery mass [kg]
nbatteries
battery efficiency
f_usable
total usable batt capacity [A hr]
nmotor
motor mass[g]
aux_current[A]
battery C rating

1.531
9.81
1.204
15.5
0.3937
0.9
0.85
6
10
22.2
1.189
1
0.9
0.85
7.65
4
68
0.38
10

Area P[m^2]
Total mass[kg]
total mass lbs
P_prop_ideal, Pii[W]
P_prop_reqd, Pi[W]
I_motor_reqd, Ii[A]
I_total, It[A]
t_endurance, th[min]
Max safe Amp draw [A]
per motor [A]

0.12
2.99
6.58
43.34
50.99
2.30
9.57
47.98
100
25

System Reliability
Using the component reliabilities researched in Table 21, a theoretical system reliability
can be determined. The components researched support either flight or surveillance functions. If
either of these functions fail while the SUAS is performed a mission, a total system failure has
occurred. Components that enable flight for the ISR SUAS are a flight computer, 4 motors,
frame, a primary battery, 4 ESCs, a BEC, a telemetry transmitter/receiver pair, a remote-control
transmitter/receiver pair, and GCS.
All components except the transmitter/receiver pairs are in series configuration, meaning
if one component fails in the chain the function of flight fails. Since the SUAS can be controlled
by either autopilot or remote-control modes, this configuration allows one mode to fail and the
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system will still perform the function of flight. This leads to a parallel configuration for the
transmitter/receiver pairs.
Equation 7-9 show the calculations for system reliability for series and parallel systems
respectively. Figure 43 shows the average reliability for the flight system of 0.8656, R1. Each
component or component group displays its respective failure rate, λ, and reliability, R. Propeller
failures are attributed to FOD contact in the environment, if this failure is mitigated by a clear
operational environment the flight system reliability increased to 0.933, R2. The surveillance
function has just three component types, a camera, payload battery and a video
transmitter/receiver pair. The gimbal system is ignored in this analysis, its failure does not
promote a critical category I failure. In other words, the surveillance function still occurs when
the gimbal fails, this is a type II failure category. Figure 44 shows the reliability diagram for the
surveillance system. For the SUAS system reliability the flight system reliability and
surveillance system reliability are multiplied together. This creates two average system
reliabilities, with propellers is 0.8615 and without is 0.9286. The resulting system MTTF is, per
Equation 10, are 6.86 hrs with propeller failure and 13.63 hrs without propellers failures.
For a point of comparison, the MTBF for a car can be evaluated. MTBF is used as the
criteria since a car can be repaired and put back into servable condition. A car has three critical
subsystems that must function for the car to drive and transport people. These subsystems are the
power train, tires, and brakes. Each subsystem has an associated MTBF based on a driving
profile, these MTBFs are then added for a system MTBF, per Equation 11. The power train has a
1500 hrs MTBF for 90,000 miles at 60 mph, the tires have 1000 hrs MTBF for 60,000 miles at
60 mph, and the brakes have a 666 hrs for 40,000 miles. These subsystem MTBF result in a car
MTBF of 315 hrs (Hamby, 2003). Reliability for a given operating time completed or conditional
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reliability can be computed using Equation 12. For a 1.5 hrs operating period, equivalent to two
SUAS missions, the SUAS reliability is 89.58% while the car reliability over the same period is
99.52%. The SUAS reliability is determined without propeller failures.
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Figure 43. Reliability Block Diagram, Flight System

Figure 44. Reliability Block Diagram, Surveillance System
Requirements Analysis
Table 34 details the projected performance of the selected ISR SUAS for each
requirement. Setup time, ISR-1, which has a threshold value of 10 min is met by the ISR SUAS
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with a projected time of 6 minutes. This time includes 150 seconds for air vehicle setup from a
backpack, 60 seconds for video receiver setup on tripod, 60 seconds for primary and secondary
battery, 60 seconds for remote control system setup, and 30 seconds for GPS initialization. This
time is projected for one operator setting up the system, the time may be reduced with and
additional operator.
ISR-2, mission planning time, objective is projected to be met using QGroundControl as
the GCS software and a laptop as the GCS hardware. QGroundControl is a user-friendly
interface for mission and route planning but does require operator training for efficient use. A
laptop as a primary GCS enables quicker functionality for mission planning opposed to a tablet
or phone. As previously mentioned, the system can be set up by one operator but is
recommended to have two operators set up to reduce set up time. With two operators, one
operator can set up the video system while the other sets up the air vehicle, reducing the set-up
time to the objective value of 5 minutes.
ISR-4, deployment range, is limited by the video system. The selected LR Connex
5.8GHz video receiver has a max directional range of 1.8 miles with a clear line of sight. The
remote control and 433Mhz Pixhawk 2 Autopilot have ranges greater than 1.8 miles. Signal
condition can impact this range and requires system level testing to prove out the SUAS range.
ISR-5, resolution, has a threshold value of 30 pixels/

to identify and track a moving

vehicle. With the selected FH310Z 1080p HD camera a 30 pixels/

can be met from 0-395 m

without the aid of the 10x zoom function of the camera, using the zoom function will only
increase this pixel density. Equation 13 was used to calculate the pixel length in meters for both
the x and y direction (“DIY Drones,” 2013). Pixel density is determined by finding the number
of pixels in 1

or taking 1/P and multiplied for both x and y values.
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ISR-6, ensures the vehicle can hover over the target for 10 minutes. Hover over target is
enabled in the ISR SUAS by using either position or altitude hold flight modes while controlling
in remote control or autopilot flight. Since the air vehicle has a theoretical hover 48 minutes, the
vehicle has time to transverse to the max range.
°

(12)

,

,
,
, 90%

,

Table 34. Requirement Analysis for ISR Mission
Rqmt

Objective

Threshold

ISR-1

Setup of system from
unpacking to ready for
launch shall be

5 min

10 min

2

ISR-2

Mission planning time from
coordinates provided to
operator to ready for launch

5 min

10 min

3

ISR-3

Description

Priority
Level

ISR-4

Operators required for setup
System shall have a range
from deployment location of

ISR-5

System shall provide
resolution for tracking a
vehicle

1
2 mile

2
1 mile

30
pixels/m^2
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5
11

7

Projected
150 Sec for AV, 60 sec
for video system, 60 sec
for battery system, 60
sec RC control, 30 sec
for GPS: 6 minutes
total
Depends on mission
complexity, 5 minutes
is projected using a
laptop with
Qgroundcontrol.
1 min, 2 ideal to buy
down set up time
1.8 miles in LOS
conditions
Camera more than
covers requirement.
Has 30 pixels/m^2 at
395 m without using
10x zoom function.

Rqmt

Description

ISR-6

System shall loiter over the
target and provide 10
minutes video of target for

ISR-7

System shall transmit geolocation

ISR-8

System shall require
dedicated operators for
control and operations

ISR-9

Operator shall be able to
identify ground targets while
controlling vehicle

System shall display near
real time imagery to the
ISR-10 operator(s)
Operators required recovery,
landing, and retrieval of the
ISR-11 system
Endurance of the system
while performing video shall
ISR-12 be

Objective

Threshold

100% of
time

85% of
time

8

15 ft

17

1

2 sec
delay

2

System shall perform "return
launch" if communication is
ISR-13 lost with operator

10

5 sec delay

12

1

18

45 minutes

X
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6

X

0
60
minutes

Priority
Level

Projected
Deconflicted A/V
signals, selected high
quality video
transmitter, air vehicle
can be placed in
position hold. Hover
endurance is 48
minutes.
HERE GPS integrated,
works with GLONASS,
BeiDou, Galileo.
Advertised within 8 ft
50% of time.
System can operate in
1-2 operator
configurations with
dual GCS control.
Flight modes are rc
control or autopilot
control modes.
Vehicle can be used in
autopilot and operator
can control camera
zoom for video. GCS
software for phone can
display live video.
1 msec latency
advertised by Connex
with LOS, 30 FPS.
Observed latency 30-46
msec.
1 to recover system, 0
to destroy system via
autopilot.

9 48 minutes at hover
Failsafes are
programable by using
in Qgroundcontrol. If
lost link occurs for X
amount of time the
system will enter return
15 to launch if programed.

Rqmt

Description

Objective

Threshold

Priority
Level

System shall indicate to
operator if GPS is lost and
allow for manual recovery
ISR-14 mode

X

14

System shall provide status
ISR-15 of battery to operator

X

13

X

19

System altitude shall be
greater than 100 ft except at
ISR-16 launch and recovery
System shall have the
capability swapping in a
night capable camera of
ISR-17 0.001 LUX or better

X

16

System shall have a low
noise profile of 50 db or
lower at minimum safe flight
ISR-18 altitude
Air vehicle shall weigh less
than 5kg and be packable in
2 standard ruck sack 22" X
ISR-19 14" X 9"
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X

4

X

1

Projected
HERE GPS and
Qgroundcontrol provide
information to operator
on GPS status including
number of satellites and
HDOP, allowing air
vehicle to enter failsafe
or operator to command
via remote control.
Battery information can
be routed through
Pixhawk 2 and sent via
telemetry data to GCS
Radio Control and
autopilot all projected
to work at greater than
100 ft
.05 Lux, traditional
color camera. Can
handle twighlight
conditions only.
15.5" foldable
propellers minimize
sound profile. Sound
testing required to
confirm.
A/V 3kg, support
equipment 5 kg. All
projected to fit within
dimensions

V. Results and Conclusion
The preceding thesis outlines a tailored system engineering product development process
for designing a SUAS for a given operational mission. Design constraints and the process
support rapid development of low-cost aircraft with systematic reduction of failure mechanisms.
The process was limited to Group I SUAS made from commercial components.
The three contributions of this research are: a process to support Small Unmanned Aerial
Systems (SUAS) design, tools to support the design process, and tools to support risk assessment
and reduction for both design and operations. The product development process allows DoD
program offices to own the technical baseline of an SUAS design, promoting better system
understanding, responsiveness to operator needs, and complete understanding of the drone
marketplace. This is a repeatable process for a given operational mission, documented in a userfriendly pictorial and demonstrated using an exemplar SUAS design for an Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission set. Tools supporting risk assessment and
reduction include operator checklists, fault tree diagrams, failure criteria, critical component
definition, critical component reliabilities, and system reliability.
This chapter discusses how the (3) investigative questions were addressed from Chapter
I, using the information from the ISR design exemplar in Chapter IV. In addition,
recommendations in support of implementing the product development process in DoD program
offices are provided. Lastly, topics for further research for expanding and refining the product
development process are discussed.
First Investigative Question
What systems engineering methods are appropriate for a tailored rapid SUAS design
process?
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The defined SUAS product development process mirrors the Initial DoD System
Engineering Process model displayed in Chapter III. The process pictorial is displayed in Figure
11. The first step is the requirements analysis. In this step focus is placed on first establishing
design needs and operational conditions from the operational user. This is a conversation, and if
possible, face to face meeting between the design team and the operational user. This
communication is paramount in identifying assumptions and clarifying needs. These needs are
translated into specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time bound design requirements for
standard to evaluate the future design against.
The second step is functional analysis and allocation. This step is first performed by
translating the design reference into a use case diagram. The use case diagram maps specific
functions the system must perform to provide use to the actors of the system. At another level of
detail is the functional allocation which displays and helps identify critical functions of the
system when evaluated against requirements. The final level of detail for the functional
allocation is perform through a fault tree analysis. The fault tree analysis investigates all the
ways critical componentry can fail on the SUAS for the given use cases for the system. Fault
trees aid in developing operator checklists to mitigated pre-flight system risks promoting a
reliable in-flight system. Operator checklists are an engineering product and discussed in further
detail in the second investigative question.
The next step in the system engineering process model is the design synthesis, which is
informed by decisions completed in the previous two steps. System design starts with the
establishment of a physical architecture, aimed at meeting requirements and critical functions of
the SUAS. By diagraming the physical architecture into a top-level view and integrated view
(internal block diagram), the system design can view critical interfaces, information flow, and
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component dependencies. This information aids in the physical component selection process, as
design decisions can be processed through based on impact to other components and system
performance. Componentry selection for the SUAS flows from components that constraint the
system architecture from most to least. Frames are selected first since they define the physical
architecture for the system, while the ground control station (GCS) is selected last due to a low
impact physical impact to the air vehicle.
With the design established, the final step of the system engineering process is system
analysis and control. System analysis is completed with inputs from all previous steps and
ensures the design is feasible in meeting the desired functions and requirements of the system. In
the case of the ISR exemplar, engineering calculations were performed for SUAS hover
endurance, system reliability, reliability for a mission, and pixel density. All other requirements
were evaluated based on input from online drone blogs, Autonomous Navigation Technology
(ANT) Lab Staff, and/or the authors experience.
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Mission/System Alignment

Initial
Design
Criteria

System Design

Physical Arch Design Checklist

10. GCS Selection

8. Power System
9. Remote Control System

7. Camera System

1. Frame Selection
2. Motor Selection
3. ESC Selection
4. Propeller Selection
5. Flight Computer
6. Video Transmitter

Constraints

Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process

Second Investigative Question

What baseline design tools and heuristics are required to support decisions for vehicle

performance, trades, reliability, assessment and follow-on designs?

Engineering products that aid in decision making for are built into the SUAS product

design process. The first product is general and displays current researched critical component
Increasing Level of Detail

failure rates. It provides program offices data on how often failures occur for flight computers,
motors, propellers, frames, batteries, electronic speed controllers, battery elimination circuits,
signal receivers, cameras, and GCS. This data provide combined with the physical architecture of
the SUAS enables a reliability analysis for the system. The system specific reliability analysis
provides the failure rate for the overall system. These calculations are tailorable to system
reliability for a given time and MTTF, providing valuable information on projected system life
and maintenance cycles.
The second product that promotes system reliability and performance are operator
checklists. These checklists are developed from fault tree diagrams aimed at mitigating pre-flight
errors that may be induced by the operator, environment, or transportation. Checklists provide
operators short repeatable rules that provide common troubleshooting advice, aligned with
specific components. Checklists are aligned with specific points in the SUAS lifecycle pre-flight,
pre-deployment, and initial flight, aimed to mitigate specific risks for common situations. For the
SUAS design team, checklists allow the majority of non-component risk to be mitigated for the
system. In turn, system risk is distilled down to component failure rates aligned with the physical
architecture. This provides the most accurate level of system reliability. Finally, a spares
checklist is included to mitigate critical component errors that occur in the deployment location.
The decision to incorporate spare kit comes at the cost of transportation of the system in the form
of weight and space.
Another valuable product to the program office is the critical component
hazard/reliability matrix. This matrix displays the failure rates of SUAS components against the
impact category to the system. The matrix is then color coded based on these two factors
provided a high, medium, or low system risk. The hazard matrix provides program office
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decision makers a visual depiction of what components are contributing the most risk to the
system. This ranking of critical components informs investment for critical components in the
form of testing, funding, and research. This process mitigates system design risk while executing
shortened development timelines.
In the system design phase, the design checklist and design trade space products provide
a valuable roadmap for designer decisions. The design checklist is built for a multirotor design
and provides critical design information for component sizing, selection, pairing, configuration,
and analysis. The design trade space evaluates common trades for multirotor SUAS highlighting
the impacts to established requirements. Additionally, the trade space identifies at what level in
the architecture the trades occurs. This provides the knowledge to decision makers on when to
evaluate trade’s in the design process, and the proposed trades impact on mission requirements.
Using both of these products while building the SUAS design, provides a stable approach to
evaluate requirements.
The final engineering product is the component selection exemplar for the ISR mission.
The process reveals the order to select components for the ISR mission and how each component
constrains other components. Each time a component is selected the design trade space is
narrowed, this enables designer to focus decision and shorten design cycles. The component
selection process is mission dependent and based on the preference of the design team. In the
case of the ISR mission, components were selected in order of architecture impact.
Third Investigative Question
What SUAS components are critical to mission success and can reliability rates be found,
documented, and analyzed for these components?
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Critical components were determined to be components whose failure induce
unrecoverable events. Unrecoverable events mean the SUAS can no longer be flow with system
failure imminent. In addition, repair time for the system to regain critical functionality is too high
for the operator to accept. In the case of the ISR mission, critical functions are flight, transport,
provide power, surveillance, and be controlled. The components that must work to uphold these
functions were determined to be the flight computer, motors, propellers, frame, battery system,
ESCs, BECs, receivers/transmitters, camera, and GCS.
It is possible to determine an estimate of system reliability. From a physical architecture
standpoint all components are in series configuration, except receivers/transmitters pairs,
meaning if one component type fails the system enters an unrecoverable event.
Receiver/transmitters pairs are in parallel configuration due to implementation of due control
mode; one via remote control and one via autopilot control. This allows one control system to
fail and still permit controlled flight.
Limited work has been performed on documenting failure rates for critical SUAS
components. It is the author’s belief that this is due to the rapid technology advancement of the
commercial drone market. Components are produced for short periods of time making reliability
testing minimally beneficial to industry and academia, since new components will improve upon
reliability. Future research is recommended on when it is worth investment in generating failure
rate data for a given platform, based on the proposed design life of the system.
Table 21 in Chapter 4 reveals the researched failure rates for critical components. Failure
rates were found in various testing conditions including operational, research/theoretical, lab, or
subject matter input. The table was validated by the AFITs ANT Lab staff as realistic values for
commercially available components. One value was determined to be an outlier for the receiver
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system at a failure rate of 0.37 failure per hour. It was determined either the product or operating
environment was suboptimal and was not included in future calculations.
Component group failure rates were average and used as the component failure rate for
system reliability calculations performed for the ISR system. Failures for components were
assumed to be past the infant mortality rate and occur within the constant failure rate zone of the
bathtub curve. At a constant failure rate, the components are in normal life of the bathtub curve
and burn-in was performed to remove early life errors.
Recommendations
The DoD can benefit from implementing mission specific SUASs for tactical and
operation mission sets. SUASs remove mission demand for larger UAS assets, freeing up flight
hours for strategic level operation. Additionally, the DoD can leverage the expanding
commercial drone market for technology, integration, and documentation for rapid custom
SUAS builds. The outlined SUAS product development process offers a simple roadmap to build
such SUASs using system engineering methods.
While the process is a roadmap to build SUASs; the process needs a plan to support
operational implementation. A recommendation is to implement the product development
process at the DoD SUAS training center, USAF 371st Special Operations Combat Training
Squadron (SOCTS) Detachment 1. SOCTS is at a critical point in SUAS development cycles
where training emergent technology occurs, and feedback is immediately provided. It is a center
of excellence for SUAS expertise in the DoD. By incorporating the product development process
at this location operator feedback on requirements, design, and checklists can be immediately
garnered, shortening development timelines.
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The initial system design of SUAS easily transitions to follow on platform developmental
testing by the operational customer. This implementation would require acquisition personnel
from various DoD service branches to ensure proper process documentation and management,
along with investigation and implementation of future drone technology. With program office
involvement on location, liaisons are available for documenting emergent operation needs and
justifying future project funding. By implementing this process with actual on-site stakeholders
of the system, not only will the product improve over time but so will the product development
process itself.
An additional recommendation is for the DoD to invest in a reliability database for
implemented critical components on deployed SUAS designs. This would allow the DoD and
program offices to justify investment in critical componentry with high failure rates, promoting
more reliable system designs. A component reliability database also informs future designs and
architecture decisions for a given mission. Finally, deployed systems life, maintenance schedule,
and reliability can be tracked, impacting future programmatic decision for sustainment or new
platform development.
Further Research
Implement SUAS product development process for all mission sets. This thesis focuses
on building a product architecture around an ISR mission set. Further research would be required
to see if the process and the engineering products of the process change for other SUAS mission
sets outlined by United States Air Force SUAS Flight Plan: 2016-2036. This research would
involve running through SUAS product development process for each mission set, documenting
any required deviation from the process, and capture all engineering products including for
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further design implications. This research would aid in validation or invalidation of the SUAS
product development process.
In depth reliability analysis of critical components. This thesis performed an initial
reliability analysis of critical components, based on current document research. For a more
robust reliability analysis research is required on determining quantitively which component
brands and components have the highest reliability. Life and operational testing would be useful
on top drone industry brands for motors, ESCs, flight computers, BECs, frames,
receiver/transmitters, and sensors. Furthermore, the SUAS designer community would benefit
from common test standards to ensure a stable reliability baseline for critical components. The
goal of reliability testing for the DoD would to possess a trusted manufacture list to choose
SUAS design components from based on empirical evidence. This would aid in mitigation of
early component life failures promoting a more predictable system reliability and life estimation.
Failure mode testing for commercially fabricated drones. Failure rates of critical
components were used to determine the system reliability of the SUAS in this thesis. An
alternate way to determine system reliability is done by determining the probably of failure
modes occurring. This analysis was left unperformed due to a lack of data on specific failures
within the SUAS. This research would require flight a series of commercially fabricated drone
platforms, documenting when failures occur, and investigate the root cause of the failure. This
would provide failure information at level lower than the component level. For example, root
cause analysis post SUAS flight failure may reveal the failure was attributed to motor over
heating opposed simply motor failure. This testing would provide information on what failures
are most common, allowing designer to not only implement material solutions but also
operational, training, and architecture solutions. It would also provide information on what
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platforms/designs excel in specific mission, narrowing the trade space for future
platform/mission pairing.
Lifecycle modeling for mission specific SUAS. Future investigation is required to
determine the useful life of mission specific SUAS. Useful life for a SUAS is dependent on how
long the design mission remains the same and how long the requirements the SUAS was
designed to are stable. In addition, program office personnel must balance system maintenance
cost versus the cost of building a new system with potential upgraded capabilities. Timelines of
new system testing, training, and deployment must also be considered in lifecycle analysis.
Recommendations are required for the optimal SUAS deployment life considering all these
factors. Product line turnover rates of the commercial drone industry would provide valuable
starting point for research.
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Appendix A. SUAS Fault Tree Diagrams
Flight Function Fault Tree Diagrams

Figure 45. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Full View
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Figure 46. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Motor Failure
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Figure 47. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Propeller and Flight Computer Failure
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Figure 48. Provide Stability Fault Tree Diagram
148

Figure 49. Launch Fault Tree Diagram
149

Figure 50. Recover and Reuse Fault Tree Diagram
150

Transport Function Fault Tree Diagram

Figure 51. Pack and Store Fault Tree Diagram
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Power Function Fault Tree Diagrams

Figure 52. Monitor Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 53. Distribute Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 54. Regulate Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 55. Store Fault Tree Diagram
155

Surveillance Function Fault Tree Diagrams

Figure 56. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Full View
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Figure 57. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Sensor Defect and Environment Failures
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Figure 58. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Sensor Configuration and Gimbal Failures
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Figure 59. Transmit and Receive Fault Tree Diagram
159

Figure 60. Human Interface Fault Tree Diagram
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Control Function Fault Tree Diagrams

Figure 61. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Full View
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Figure 62. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Gimbal and Mode Failures
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Figure 63. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Zoom, Power, and Sensor Failures
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Figure 64. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: Full View
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Figure 65. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: RC Failure
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Figure 66. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: Autopilot and Flight Computer Failure
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Figure 67. Failsafe Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 68. Guidance Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 69. Provide Status Fault Tree Diagram
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Appendix B. SUAS Design Online Sources
The sources detailed in this table were used to aid in building operator checklists, design
checklists, design trade space, and component selection performed in Chapter IV of this thesis.
Table 35. SUAS Design Online Sources
Name

Type

ardupilot.org
rcgroups.com
phantompilots.com
diydrones.com
dronetrest.com
droneflyers.com
reddit.com/r/Multicopter

Blog
Blog
Blog
Blog
Blog
Blog
Blog

Focus
Pixhawk flight computer
help
general advice
DJI advice
general advice
general advice
general advice
general advice
general advice on power
sources
general advice
custom Builds
motors/ propellers
motors/ propellers
drone components
cameras
electronics
cutting edge components

blog.ravpower.com
dronereviewhot.blogspot.com
foxtechfpv.com
store-en.tmotor.com
kdedirect.com
hobbyking.com
flir.com
castlecreations.com
team-blacksheep.com

Blog
Blog
Store
Store
Store
Store
Store
Store
Store/Infosite
Infosite/ Product
myfirstdrone.com
reviews
DJI focus
ecalc.ch.com
Endurance Calculator analysis
futabarc.com
Manufacture
RC transmitter specs
amimon.com
Manufacture
video transmitter specs
aopa.org
Pilots Association
news/tips/general advice
blacktieaerial.com
How to Guide
build instructions and tips
How to Guide/
build, subsystem
beginnerflyer.com
Product Review
instructions and info
oscarliang.com
Expert Advice
building/ components
dronethusiast.com
Expert Advice
tips, news, reviews
thedronegirl.com
Expert Advice
tips, news, reviews
*Top Source Indicates multiple design inputs or topics were used from source.
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Top
Source*
X
X
X
X
X

X

Appendix C. SUAS Reference CONOPS SENG Design Sequence
Rev 1: 13 Jan 2015
Section I - Issue
A. Problem Statement
In the past decade, the US Military and Department of Homeland Security have seen the
numerous benefits, and have come to rely upon, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and their role
in combat and information operations. Fixed wing platforms such as the Predator (MQ1)/Reaper (MQ-9) and the Global Hawk (RQ-4) have tremendous capabilities but they are lowdensity/high-demand (LDHD) assets; making their availability limited to all but the most critical
missions. As a result, there has been rapid growth in the area of smaller, unit controlled, RPAs,
referred to herein as small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). These are small (less than 20 lbs
sized air vehicles capable of being operated by small forward deployed units or individuals.
These vehicles provide critical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data before,
during, and after ground operations. Current shortcomings of existing small UAS include
unreliable imaging, high operator workload, and an inability to track and provide geocoordinates for a target vehicle.
B. Overarching Vision
To deliver timely and relevant ISR to forward deployed ground based units via the use of a small
UAS. Non-cooperatively track a target vehicle using a hand-launched, single operator UAS.
C. Purpose of the CONOPS
This document describes operational employment scenarios whereby military personnel could
realize the benefits offered by a small, easily deployed and operated, UAS. A common
command, control, and communications interface will be utilized, enhancing the system
flexibility and making the system adaptable to a wide variety of situations and environments.
The system will have a versatile payload configuration allowing for multiple ISR configurations.

D. Scope
This document is intended to be an Enabling Concept and is written at the tactical-level.
Specifically, the Small UAS CONOPS will describe the anticipated utilization and supporting
context required to provide tactical ISR to include vehicle tracking. The system must allow for
deployment and operation from a single forward based operator in a denied access environment.
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Section II – Overview
A. Synopsis
A Small UAS will provide forward deployed ground based units the capability to conduct low
altitude, ISR and vehicle tracking operations from a safe standoff distance with minimal
logistical support. Specifically, the use of the UAS will allow operators to:
 Rapidly setup and deploy Small UAS from austere location
 Covertly loiter over a desired target area, providing uninterrupted, or nearcontinuous video coverage over a target for a 10 minute interval
 Continuously track a moving vehicle
 Utilize payloads optimized for low altitude operations capable of providing
sufficient resolution for target identification
 Monitor ISR data from safe standoff distance
 Conduct Small UAS operations while maintaining situational awareness of the
location around the operator
 Provide timely ISR data for ongoing/future ground operations

B. Sequenced Actions (Phases)
Ground Control Setup & Teardown Phase: This phase encompasses all actions necessary to
deploy the UAS including: unpacking, inventory, assembly, function checks, and mission
planning.
Launch Phase: This phase encompasses all actions necessary to achieve initial stable flight
starting from a properly configured air vehicle and ground control system. A single operator
should be capable of launching the system. Launch phase ends once stable flight is achieved
and the system begins navigation towards the target location.
Ingress/Egress Phase: This phase involves transit to/from the target area. The target area can
be expected to be a minimum 0.5 miles to 1.0 mile from home base/ launch area.
Acquisition Phase: The UAS will autonomously detect and acquire a vehicle target. Upon
acquisition, the UAS will commence with the surveillance phase.
Surveillance Phase: Surveillance of the target will be maintained for a minimum of a 10
minute time span. Surveillance data will be of sufficient resolution for an operator to
perform identification of a target vehicle from the supplied video feed. While identification
of the target vehicle may be confirmed by the operator, initial
detection/acquisition/reacquisition of the target vehicle will be performed autonomously by
the UAS. Continuous, or near-continuous, coverage of a target for a 5 minute interval is
required. We define continuous as 100% of a 5 minute interval the target is in the field of
view. Near-continuous is defined as greater than 85%. It should be expected that the target
vehicle will be moving for at least a portion of the surveillance phase.
Recovery Phase: This phase involves recovering the air vehicle upon completion of the
mission or as deemed necessary. A single operator should be capable of navigating the air
vehicle to the recovery location, safely landing the vehicle, and retrieving the vehicle for reuse.
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Overall Mission: The solution should have a minimum mission duration of 45 minutes. This
shall be verified using a combination of flight test data and analysis of current draw and
battery capacity.
External Environment: The UAS will generally operate in an austere and hostile environment
under a myriad of environmental conditions. The operational environment will be assumed
to have global positioning system (GPS) signal as it will be the primary navigation aid for the
RPA. Operational employment may be dependent upon terrain obstacles and/or operational
altitude as the primary human-to-vehicle communication pathway will be a high-frequency
radio signal. Line-of-sight limitations will have to be accounted for in mission planning.
C. Description of Military Challenge




Forward based operators would like to provide continuous, or near-continuous coverage
of a target area for a 5 minute period.
Forward based operators would like to be able to acquire and track a moving target
vehicle for an XX minute period.
Forward based operators would like a simplified interface and low workload for the
above tasks so they can maintain situational awareness and security around their
immediate location.

Section III – Context
A. Time Horizon
This CONOPS focuses on an enabling capability intended to provide ground based units with
ISR data in support of theater directed mission taskings. This CONOPS provides employment
recommendations for a proposed UAS. Through expanded operation and utilization, the
recommendations provided are intended to evolve into strategic employment scenarios as best
practices are collected and documented. The planned initial utilization begins in FY14 and is
expected to be used for 2-3 years in the future.
B. Assumptions
This CONOPS assumes that the capability gap identified herein is still present and unresolved.
Additionally, it is assumed that airspace deconfliction issues will be resolved, if necessary, prior
to each mission utilizing the small UAS as there is no intent to address that specific issue within
this document.
C. Risks
The following risks were derived from a consortium of stake holders including, former RPA
operators, systems architects, subject matter experts, system designers, and testers:
 Loss of RPA due to hostile detection and action
 Loss of RPA due to broken communications link
 Loss of RPA due to system malfunction
 Loss of RPA due to extreme environmental conditions
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Hostile detection of operator location
Hostile acquisition of signal feeds and/or control of RPA
Loss of mission due to unreliability of system components
Loss of mission due to system degradation
Loss of RPA and/or mission due to lack of logistical resources
Loss of RPA and/or mission due to lack of operator knowledge
Injury to operator and/or noncombatants from system operation

D. System Requirements
A Small UAS will provide forward deployed ground based units the capability to conduct low
altitude, ISR and small payload deployment operations from a safe standoff distance with
minimal logistical support. Specifically, the UAS will allow operators to:
 Rapidly setup, mission plan, and deploy Small UAS from austere location. You
should assume power will not be available at the austere locations.
- The system shall require one (objective) or two (threshold) operators to
perform concurrent vehicle setup and mission planning.
- Vehicle setup for the small UAS system shall take 10 minutes or less to
complete, measured from the time unpacking begins to the time when the
system is ready for launch.
- Mission planning shall take nor more than 10 minutes to perform.
Mission planning starts when surveillance and drop target coordinates are
provided to the operator, and concludes when the vehicle is ready for
launch.
- Setup shall be performed without the assistance of any power source not
provided as part of the UAS system
 Transit to Target
- The system shall be capable of navigating to a target at a distance of 0.5
mile (threshold) to 1.0 mile (objective) distance from the deployment
location.
 Autonomously acquire a vehicle target, and maintain track while the target is in
motion.
- The system shall provide video with sufficient resolution for target
identification and tracking. Sufficiency of resolution is defined as 30
pixels/m2 at the target plane (to identify vehicles).
 Loiter over a desired target, providing uninterrupted, or near-continuous
imagery/video of the target for a 10 minute interval.
- The system shall be capable of providing 10 minutes of continuous
(objective – target in FOV 100% of time) or near-continuous (threshold –
target in FOV 85% of time).
- Continuously display geo-coordinates of the target vehicle to the operator
throughout the time while the target is being tracked.
- Accuracy of the target geo-location shall be 150 ft DRMS (or better).
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The system shall loiter at an altitude not to exceed 1000 feet above ground
level.
- The system shall be capable of flight up to altitudes of 2000 feet above sea
level.
Monitor ISR date from safe standoff distance.
- The system shall be capable of operating at a distance of 2000’ from the
operator/ground station, with an objective range of 2 miles from the
operator/ground station.
Conduct Small UAS operations while maintaining situational awareness of the
location around the operator.
- Control and operation of the UAS shall require not more than two
dedicated operators, with an objective of a single operator.
- The operator(s) shall be able to identify ground targets while
simultaneously controlling the vehicle.
Provide timely ISR data for ongoing/future ground operations.
- Imagery/video from the UAS will be displayed in real-time to the ground
operator(s).
Recovery Phase
- A single operator shall be capable of navigating the air vehicle to the
recovery location, safely landing the vehicle, and retrieving the vehicle for
re-use.
- For purposes of flight test purposes, a safety pilot will land the vehicle
once the rest of the mission has been completed.
Mission Duration
- The solution shall have a minimum mission duration of 45 minutes. This
shall be verified using flight a combination of flight test data and analysis
of current draw and battery capacity.
The UAS must be capable of recovering from common operational problems
- The UAS shall provide to the operator status of fuel and/or battery power
available.
- The UAS shall provide an automated “return to launch” if communication
to the operator station is lost.
- The UAS shall provide an indication to the operator in the event of GPS
loss, and shall include a manual recovery mode if within LOS when GPS
is lost.
Other
- Safe flight must be greater than 100 feet during all phases expect launch
and recovery.
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